

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOL. XXII. No. 3.

JULY, 1930

VICTOR VERACIS BRANFORD,

Editor, SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW..

ON Sunday, 22nd June, while this Part of the REVIEW was going through the Press, Victor Branford died in a Nursing Home at Hastings. His death was not expected by his wide circle of friends and acquaintances: few of these knew even that he was seriously unwell. His body was buried in Hastings Cemetery on Wednesday, 25th June, after a service at All Souls' Church. Representatives of the Institute of Sociology attended the funeral: a wreath sent by the Council and Officers was among those laid on the grave.

VICTOR BRANFORD was Editor of the REVIEW from 1917 to 1930—14 years. He carried the periodical through the most difficult part of the Great War period, and was responsible for its development and extension after the war. Its existence to this day in its present form is his work more than any other man's. Particularly in the later years he gave the REVIEW constant thought: besides editing it, he contributed over a long period, and generously, to its finances. Both contributors and readers will be deeply conscious of the loss suffered by his death.

THESE few words are a quite inadequate tribute, but must serve, as there are not now time and space for more. It is hoped that an extended account of Branford's work as a sociologist may be published in the near future.

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THE book is indeed a scholarly work of library texts, their mutual contradictions, variations in Hindu exogamy, i.e., marrying out beyond cognates of third to seventh degree, showing how borrowed these customs from the aborigines to establish their social superiority, and how high and low are trying to imitate them. retrospective learning, looks respectfully on scientific learning would perhaps hold their pages, 220 pages deal with dry and learned details assumed by Hindu exogamy, at different times, and are thus simply full of the passing past; 62 pages deal with the present aspects of exogamy, and only 8 with the eugenic or ever present, permanent or prospective aspect of it. Thus, while the book may satisfy historic curiosity, it might unfortunately foster a traditional outlook instead of the scientific, fresh and forward vision we so much need, specially in India.

S. N. PHERWANI.

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exogamy. Thus, while Manu allows cognate marriages to be contracted in the third generation on the father's as well as mother's side, Gautama in the Sutra period sanctions marriages after seven generations from the father's and five from the mother's side. But Sapinda exogamy was never looked upon with as much disfavour as Sept exogamy. While breach of the rule of Sept exogamy always nullified the marriage, breach of the rule of Sapinda exogamy did not invalidate the marriage. In chapter ten, the author deals with the development of the rule of Sapinda exogamy after the eighth century, and shows while the rule became more rigid in the North, it was considerably relaxed in the Deccan. Exogamy among the non-Brahmins is dealt with in the eleventh chapter. Castes of different types, such as those next to the Brahmans, the eponymous ones, like Agarwals, Baidyas, Bhatias, &c., and the non-Aryan totemic castes which are being gradually Hinduised, the castes that observe only the rule of Sapinda exogamy, local and territorial castes, and castes based on the number of gods worshipped by each family, are dealt with in detail, and their exogamous practices indicated. The last chapter deals with exogamy of the Hindus in the light of eugenics, and shows that it has a traditional rather than a scientific basis and advises non-Brahmins to analyse and sift before they embrace any Brahmanical dogmas, with regard to exogamy.

THE book is indeed a scholarly work of library research, dealing with ancient texts, their mutual contradictions, variations and confirmation regarding Hindu exogamy, i.e., marrying out beyond agnates of all degrees, and cognates of third to seventh degree, showing how the Brahmans originally borrowed these customs from the aborigines, and made these rules rigid to establish their social superiority, and how gradually all Hindu castes high and low are trying to imitate them. While static, disputative, and retrospective learning, looks respectfully on such researches, life, love and scientific learning would perhaps hold them of little value. Out of 290 pages, 220 pages deal with dry and learned discussion on the various aspects assumed by Hindu exogamy, at different times, and are thus simply full of the passing past; 62 pages deal with the present aspects of exogamy, and only 8 with the eugenic or ever present, permanent or prospective aspect of it. Thus, while the book may satisfy historic curiosity, it might unfortunately foster a traditional outlook instead of the scientific, fresh and forward vision we so much need, specially in India.

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THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.*

I.

PREFACE ABSTRACTED LARGELY IN THE WORDS OF PROFESSOR E. R. A. SELIGMAN.

It is only in comparatively recent years that the interdependence of the social sciences has come to be recognised as a concept necessary to their progress. The older sciences had such a mass of phenomena to arrange and to interpret that each of them was busy in pursuing its own problems. The newer sciences found enough to do in staking

*ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Macmillan and Co. Ltd. MCMXXX. London. (31s. 6d.)

The first volume of the much anticipated Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences has appeared. The Editor-in-Chief is Professor E. R. A. Seligman, with Professor Alvin Johnson as Associate Editor. This portly volume runs to XXVII. plus 646 pages double print. There are XXVII. pages taken up with preliminary matters, such as the list of American and Foreign Advisory Editors, the Constituent Societies, and a very long list of Editorial Consultants chosen from leading men in Europe and America. Then follow 349 pages of preliminary and explanatory essays. These are divided as follows:—

INTRODUCTION I.—THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS.

I. WHAT ARE THE SOCIAL SCIENCES ?	Edwin R. A. Seligman.
II. GREEK CULTURE AND THOUGHT	William Linn Westermann.
III. THE ROMAN WORLD	Tenney Frank.
IV. THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH	Bede Jarrett.
V. THE GROWTH OF AUTONOMY	E. F. Jacob.
VI. RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION	F. J. C. Hearnshaw.
VII. THE RISE OF LIBERALISM	Harold J. Laski.
VIII. THE REVOLUTIONS	Crane Brinton.
IX. INDIVIDUALISM AND CAPITALISM	Charles A. Beard.
X. NATIONALISM	Carl Brinkmann.
XI. THE TREND TO INTERNATIONALISM	R. M. MacIver.
XII. WAR AND REORIENTATION	Editorial Staff.

INTRODUCTION II.—THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AS DISCIPLINES.

I. GREAT BRITAIN	E. M. Burns.
II. FRANCE, BELGIUM & ROMANIC SWITZERLAND	Henri Levy-Bruhl.
III. GERMANY	Edgar Salin.
IV. AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY	Theo Suranyi-Unger.
V. ITALY—Italy to the End of the World War	Augusto Graziani.
Italy under Fascism	Herbert W. Schneider.
VI. RUSSIA—Imperial Russia	Peter Struve
Soviet Russia	M. Pokrovsky.
VII. SCANDINAVIA	Bertil Ohlin.
VIII. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL	Fernando de los Rios.
IX. LATIN AMERICA	L. L. Bernard.
X. JAPAN	Teizo Toda.
XI. UNITED STATES	L. L. Bernard.

Finally there are 297 pages of specialised articles running from Aaronson to Allegiance.

out their respective fields and in vindicating their claim to existence as separate disciplines. There was much to be said for the view that in the early years of development the greatest progress could be made by emphasising differences rather than similarities, but there has come a slow realisation that, while there are all kinds of associations and many angles from which human contacts can profitably be studied, it is a mistake to separate them permanently into independent sections. Especially is this true when we consider the relation of the individual to the group and endeavour to comprehend the subtle influences reciprocally exerted by the various manifestations of common activity. The conclusions reached by the separate sciences were gradually recognised, therefore, as incomplete and provisional, and the demand arose for a better analysis through a more comprehensive synthesis. To provide this is the purpose of the Encyclopædia which is sponsored by the following :

American Anthropological Association.
 American Association of Social Workers.
 American Economic Association.
 American Historical Association.
 American Political Science Association.
 American Psychological Association.
 American Sociological Society.
 American Statistical Association.
 Association of American Law Schools.
 National Education Association.

BUT although the inception of the project and its management are within the United States, and of its board of twenty-eight Advisory Editors seventeen are American, the policy has been in every case to select the scholar best fitted to write the particular article. The editor-in-chief during his visit to Europe in 1927, which included all the important universities from Oslo to Florence, conferred with the most distinguished scholars and was both astonished and encouraged by their enthusiasm and their readiness to co-operate in what was recognised to be not only a gigantic project but also one which would be of great importance to the progress of the social sciences throughout the world.

II.

THE Encyclopædia includes all the purely social sciences but, obviously, detailed treatment would be inappropriate since the real object is not so much to exhaust each particular subject as to bring out in the respective topics the relations of each science to all the other relevant

disciplines. Thus an endeavour is made to include all the important topics in politics, economics, law, anthropology, sociology, penology and social work.

IN the case of what are designated as semi-social sciences—ethics, education, philosophy and psychology—those topics are selected of which the social aspects are acquiring increasing significance ; similarly with the sciences with social implications, as biology and geography on the one hand, and medicine, philology and art on the other.

BIOGRAPHIES of deceased persons whose work has been significant in the various sciences are included and the space allotted to them covers about one-fifth of the contents.

IN the making of the Encyclopædia there have been three guiding purposes. In the first place it is intended to provide for the scholar a synopsis of the progress that has been made in the various fields of social science in the broadest sense of the term. The student of any particular science will not only find factual and methodological information of value, but will also have his attention called to the relation of his own science to the other disciplines involved. Further, and probably more important at the present time, the Encyclopædia may be expected to serve as an incentive to the votaries of the younger and more inchoate sciences in order to bring to fruition what is now only in germ.

SECONDLY, the appeal is to a much more numerous class which for lack of a better term might be called the intelligentsia in the various countries. The Encyclopædia will furnish a repository of facts and principles which will subserve the interests of those who are keeping abreast of recent investigation and accomplishment.

FINALLY, it is hoped that amid the welter and confusion of modern thought, the Encyclopædia will constitute a centre of authoritative knowledge for the creation of a more informed public opinion on the major questions which lie at the foundation of social progress and world development.

THE first volume of the Encyclopædia is equipped with an extended introduction designed in its first part to exhibit the filiation of the social sciences and their contemporaneous relationship, as well as their dependence on the institutional and general intellectual situation ; in the second division is an account of the social sciences as disciplines, in their historical development, throughout the world.

WE give below, as far as possible in the author's own words, a summary of the first part of this introduction.

II.

INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR E. R. A. SELIGMAN, ABSTRACTED
LARGELY IN THE WRITER'S OWN WORDS.

What are the Social Sciences?

FROM the very beginning of analysis and classification the field of science has been divided between physical nature and the phenomena of mind. The natural sciences deal with the phenomena of the universe. By common consent, although not quite accurately, we contrast with these what are traditionally termed the mental or cultural sciences. We say "not quite accurately" because it is clearly inadmissible to assume that the mind is entirely independent of the body or that mental processes are not in themselves subject, in part at least, to the play of natural forces.

ACCEPTING, however, this common distinction it is obvious that the cultural sciences fall into two categories. The one deals with man as a separate individual, conceived of as dissociated from his fellow beings, the other treats of man as a member of a group. In contrast to the separate wants, which can be satisfied by the unaided action of the individual, are wants experienced by the individual which can be satisfied only by associated or group action. These we call the common wants. The phenomena thus related to group activities are commonly called social phenomena, and the sciences which classify and interpret such activities are the social sciences. Thus these may be defined as those mental or cultural sciences which deal with the activities of the individual as a member of a group. They may be said to fall into three classes—the purely social sciences, the semi-social sciences and the sciences with social implications.

PERHAPS the earliest of the social sciences is politics, for the most important of human groups has in general been the state. The state is indeed not the earliest group, nor has it always been the most important but when scientific discussion arose in Greece, the pre-political groups had dwindled to insignificance or had been absorbed by the all-embracing state. The chief concern of the Greek sages was accordingly politics or political science.

ON a somewhat lower plane in their purview stood the second of the social sciences, economics. For while politics dealt with the state—the noblest embodiment of human striving—economics had reference to the *oikos*, the household which represented man's property relations. The right ordering of the household—including in one's possessions his wife, his children and his slaves—was indeed important; but the acquisition of wealth, especially in what we should nowadays call business, seemed to the Greeks to stand on a distinctly lower level.

WHEN in the sixteenth century the problem of the acquisition of wealth shifted from that of individual salvation to national strength and power, the way was prepared for the advent of modern economics. Because of these national prepossessions, de Watteville suggested the term political economy and even Adam Smith, despite his doubts as to the desirability of government interference, could not escape from fastening it on the discipline which he did so much to develop. It was over a century later before the real social implications of the science were perceived and its leading votaries reverted to the name given to it by the Greeks. The political implications are indeed apprehended, but even more than politics itself economics is nowadays recognised as primarily a social science.

THE third of the older disciplines that we trace back to the Greeks is history which from the outset has laid claim to a field co-extensive with human interests. In the work of Herodotus history appears more closely related to the art of literature than to any science and throughout the centuries this union has been maintained. In the hands of Thucydides history centred its interest in the state; its spirit became essentially scientific, and its methods and results represent important contributions to political science. Among the classical and mediæval successors of Herodotus and Thucydides the function of history as an inquiry into the genesis and development of political forms and institutions was never entirely forgotten. In the last century it has not only become far more rigorous in its scientific method, but it has extended its scope to the inclusion of the manifold phenomena of human life and has thus become an indispensable source of material for the interpretation of all manner of social processes.

THE fourth of the older social disciplines is jurisprudence. It arose only long after the legal systems of relatively advanced states had developed and was primarily cultivated by the Romans because of their need to solidify their world empire. The civil law, like the common law, yielded the chief opportunities that existed in the Middle Ages for the discussion of what were the most important relations of man to man. Next to theology law was the moving force in the creation of the mediæval universities. It was the most significant of the cultural sciences and its votaries outnumbered those devoted to politics or history.

JURISPRUDENCE was conceived as something quite independent of, and unrelated to, the other social disciplines. It is only in very recent times that a change for the better has ensued. More and more have we come to recognise the reciprocal relations of law and economics; more and more has criminal law been influenced by penology; more and more do we hear of the new sociological jurisprudence. What is

taking place is a recognition of the fact that legal relations are inextricably intertwined with other phases of human association, and that an adequate legal system must always reflect the myriad forms of social life.

THUS the four older disciplines—politics, economics, history and jurisprudence—have outgrown their early separatism and have increasingly realised their interpenetration. Concurrently with this growing recognition of the intertwining of all the human strands in the texture of life, there have arisen newer disciplines as the result of the modern curiosity as to social relations.

THE first of these is anthropology. A study of early man, historic and prehistoric, became possible only after the rise of some of the natural sciences like geology. The unearthing of primitive artifacts—tools, implements and ornaments—led to the discussion of their uses or social connotations; and the later progress in the study of still existing primitive groups broadened the comprehension of all manner of early customs. Thus anthropology was ready, almost from the outset, to recognise its affiliations with other social sciences and the light which it threw on early political, economic and legal conditions was of reciprocal benefit.

THE second of the newer social sciences is penology. Until the time of Beccaria and Bentham there was no development of such a science; the commission of crime was *lèse majesté*—an infraction of the king's peace or of the community's tranquillity. It was only natural for society to revenge itself on the malefactor by putting him out of the way. But when it was recognised that attention must be paid not only to the rights of the group but to the possibilities of the individual, the first step was taken toward a more rational theory of punishment. A much longer step in advance was taken when crime was recognised as at least in part a disease. The final advance was the realisation of a large degree of social responsibility for both crime and disease. Modern penology as a social pathology is contributing in full measure to the understanding of a normal social life.

SOCIOLOGY, the next of the newer sciences, is only three-quarters of a century old, and has scarcely come of age even to-day. It is the most ambitious of all the social sciences, because in a sense the most comprehensive. As its name signifies, it is an endeavour to lay bare the foundations of all living together, to elucidate the laws which lie at the basis of social intercourse. Sociology is the social science *par excellence* and being the most difficult of the cultural sciences is still far from the definiteness and unity that characterise the older social sciences. It is natural, therefore, that broad generalisations lacking adequate verification still hold an important place in sociological theory. It remains the most important of human sciences for

only when progress has been made in the elucidation of its laws can we hope to attain a comprehension of life itself with its countless facets.

IN the formative period of the history of sociology a wide range of activities were subsumed under its rubrics, although not essentially related to its theories. What characterises this entire field is the association of scientific inquiry with social action. The typical procedure is an investigation of a concrete situation as, for example, excessive infant mortality in a given area, followed by recommendations for remedial action, and the actual organisation and administration of remedial measures.

FOR this whole range of activities the term social work has come into vogue and holds a position analogous to engineering in its modern phases. Like the engineer the social worker starts with a concrete problem and in devising remedial measures derives his materials not only from the other social sciences but also from the natural sciences and the arts. Schools, hospitals, nurseries, housing, employment in factories or in commercial establishments, institutions for the handicapped, may serve as examples of the fields in which the social worker applies his professionalised methods of investigation and offers his professional services.

THE sciences that have thus far been mentioned are the purely social sciences. Side by side with them we must put the semi-social sciences and these fall into two categories. In the first the most important is ethics, in a certain sense the most sublime of all the sciences. Ethical conduct is primarily a question of the individual for conscience is a personal matter. It has been increasingly recognised, however, that individual morality is itself the resultant of social forces for without the group there would have been no conception of right or wrong. The individual experiences not only a separate want which can be satisfied by his own action but also a common want which only union with others can satisfy. He must defer to his associates; he must cease doing certain things and must begin to do other things. So morality is born.

As the common wants multiply new concessions to the other members of the group are continually made until there emerge certain standards of conduct calculated to achieve the desired results. Concepts of right and wrong are thus social in origin although it is largely an unconscious process by which the criterion of the distinction is relegated to the individual himself.

THE increasing contact between groups of all kinds has engendered a new aspect of the moral problem, that of the conduct of groups toward each other. It is in this sphere of activity, international and

intranational, that the least progress has been made. Group morality is still far inferior to individual morality.

ANALOGOUS to ethics is education for it also, to some extent at least, is social in origin. The unfolding of the individual mind and the strengthening of the individual aptitude cannot be adequately achieved in isolation. The activity of the individual in the group and the reactions of the group on the individual are of signal importance. Education for the satisfactory accomplishment of the social duties is an indispensable part of all modern curricula and it has, in a wider sense and with a different technique, come to be predicated of the group as well.

IN contrast to ethics and education are those sciences which, originally separate, have acquired a social content. Philosophy, in a certain sense the forerunner of science, was long considered as something entirely independent. When we deal with the final interpretation of life, of thought and of conduct we seem to be treading on ground unbroken by science but in proportion as parts of the unknown are converted into the known, new sciences are detached from the all-embracing philosophy and pursue a life of their own.

THE social relations of man still constitute one of the many domains cultivated by philosophy and have acquired a new significance as a recognised factor in the formulation of philosophic doctrines. The character of its problems and the methods of solution have been, in part at least, influenced by social conditions so that not only does social philosophy as such demand growing attention but all philosophy lends a more willing ear to social discussion. In this sense we may speak of philosophy as in part a social science.

IN psychology the transition is more unmistakable. The study of the mental processes of the individual was a favourite field of philosophy but scarcely had it split off into an acknowledged science than as a study of human behaviour it was recognised to be in part social in character. With a deepening knowledge of the mechanistic and the biological foundations of life and thought, the psychologist perceives that the entire process has been moulded by the human as well as the natural environment, and that the concept of the individual is untenable as an explanation of actual fact. Psychology is therefore becoming social in a double sense: the individual mechanism of mental processes is interpreted, in part at least, in terms of a social environment; and secondly, in dealing with the thought process of the group, the individual is regarded not simply as unconsciously influenced by others but as purposively co-operating with them.

THERE remains the last category of sciences, some of them natural, others cultural, which have well defined and increasingly recognised social implications.

OF these the first is biology. Far broader in its scope than man, it is compelled in its dynamic aspects, in so far as it is applied to human beings, to deal in large measure with the conditions of associative action. Moreover some of its recent offshoots, like eugenics, have an overwhelming social content while the development of social biology, the science of group changes, is noteworthy.

SLIGHTLY different is geography which began indeed as the study of the earth's surface but soon advanced to a consideration of the territorial distribution both of natural and of social phenomena. It is thus in an excellent position to analyse the interaction between man and his social heritage, on the one hand, and the natural environment, on the other. In this lies its importance to the social sciences, enabling them to explain the regional peculiarities of human societies and institutions.

WHILE biology and geography started out with no thought of man, the second group of the sciences with social implications was virtually limited from the outset to man. Although the scope of medicine has been extended to animals, it is still supremely a human science. The physician while necessarily dealing with the health of individuals realises more and more that disease is in part a product of social forces and this reciprocal influence of individual and group is still further attested by the development of social hygiene and public health.

LINGUISTICS, in its social scientific aspects, has had a somewhat chequered career. Under late nineteenth century criticism the claims of the comparative philologists to authoritative interpretation of prehistoric movements of peoples were much abated. Linguistics remains, however, an important instrument of social scientific inquiry. Judiciously employed, the history of words often sheds light on the history of institutions and modes of thought.

FINALLY we come to the realm of art. Art as creative activity stands in contrast with science, whose objective is analysis and understanding. But artistic creation is dominated by values and these are, at least in part, of social origin. No one who wishes to understand the operation of social laws in the modern world can afford to overlook the evidence offered by the arts.

A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE SOCIAL SYNTHESIS:• by Victor Branford.

As an organised body of knowledge with its specialised means of research, Sociology has been the latest of the master-sciences to emerge; Of necessity this was so; and for a double reason. In the first place, social phenomena, being the most complex of all, are hardest to arrange and classify in such a way as to distinguish the general and the symptomatic from the particular and the incidental. In the second place, there are the pre-occupations, and consequent bias, of interests associated with self, group, class, nation, empire; all of them inimical to the detached observation and verifiability of generalisation which science demands. But there is a commonsense method in the gathering, ordering and accumulating of knowledge, which anticipates the substance of science and forecasts the refinements of scientific method. To speak thus, empirically, one may say that sociology is not the youngest of the master-sciences, but perhaps the oldest.

EVERY-DAY "SOCIOLOGIES."

THE making of "sociologies" (more strictly one should say pro-sociologies) is in fact a perennial process of human society. For it will not be denied that in all past and present forms of society, from earliest and simplest to most recent and developed, each individual accumulates not only a working experience of life, but also engages in some general reflections thereon, which may, and usually do, modify action in their turn. In this sense, then, everyone tends to be his own sociologist. And since each individual mind reflects, and is reflected in, some larger grouping, it follows that every community, and even every class and order therein, is ever making, or renewing, its own "sociology," though this may be mainly implicit, or but slightly systematised and expressed. And herein may be found a certain justification for the popular confusion of socialism with

*The above paper is one of several articles written by the Editor of this Review, during recent years, for various encyclopædias. It was, however, discarded in favour of a more conventional presentation, and has not hitherto been published. Nevertheless the paper presents what its writer believes to be the main historic line of sociological development. This line, beginning with predecessors such as Montesquieu and Condorcet, has for its main initiators Comte and Le Play, with Spencer as (in some ways) a continuator of Comte, and Demolins and de Tourville as continuators of Le Play; and for us of this generation, it culminates in the synthetic work of Geddes, who may be regarded as not only a continuator of both the Comte and Le Play traditions, but also as a re-initiator, since he integrates the essential contributions of the two main founders and develops the resulting doctrine along new lines. He systematically incorporates into the sociological synthesis the relevant specialisms such as economics, social geography, anthropology, social psychology; and further he has contrived a method (inadequately called Regional and Civic Survey) whereby sociological studies may be applied to contemporary life in the open-air way of the field naturalist.

sociology. The theory of socialism is an endeavour to explain and set forth in commonsense terms the social process in its origin and development, its tendencies for good and ill, and further to show how the good tendencies may be advanced, and the evil ones checked, corrected or even reversed. And socialism in practice, or in propaganda, seeks to test its theory, and apply its ideals, in the everyday world of current realities. Stated in these general terms, the theory and practice of socialism challenge comparison with sociology pure and applied. The same claim, of course, has to be made for all the "sociologies," or pro-sociologies, that grew up before, or coincidentally with, that view of the social process which came into existence in the early nineteenth century as a deliberate and ordered attempt to extend into the human sphere the specific tradition and the characteristic methods of the established sciences.

RELIGIONS AND THEOLOGIES.

FOR further illustration might be taken the "sociology" implicit in each of the great religious systems. And here (as may be elsewhere) the comparison would not always be to the advantage of sociology proper. In Catholic theology, for instance, there are formative concepts capable of secular restatement in terms not only verifiable but outranging, in grasp of essentials, the insight of current sociology. Take, for single example, the doctrine of redemption from sin by grace bestowed through the efficacy of sacraments. For this doctrine the sociologist seeks a secular interpretation, without prejudice to theological presuppositions. Assume then the aim of the eucharistic sacrament to be an evocation and maintenance of those high qualities of impassioned life which are recognised as spiritual. To effect this ennoblement of life and mind not only for a favoured few, but for a whole community, means the transformation of everyday folk into a social *élite*. It implies a community of believers bound together by faith in the reality of life's ideals. But an accepted pattern of human perfection must first be designed and then revealed and exhibited by the thaumaturgy of art. That end has to be achieved by the selection of appropriate elements from the social heritage, their integration as doctrine, and their composition into arousing imagery presented with the dramatic appeal of ritual. Towards this elevation of ordinary folk into a social *élite*, the Catholic Church has devoted age-long experimental endeavours to which no secular system, political, educational, or sociological, as yet, shows a parallel. Yet the Catholic process of ennoblement goes beyond the dramatisation of a select social heritage. For over against the ideals of life, historic and contemporary, there stand menacingly the temptations of a prodigious burden of evils accumulated in our organic ancestry, aggravated by the misdeeds of the past, and concentrated in the allurements of the

present. To be "redeemed" from this "sinful" situation is a prior need in the pursuit of perfection. And it would seem that the redemptive office can be performed by evocative imagery in proportion as we are kept responsive to its "sanctity," or purifying power of appeal to the idealising aspiration. And, reasonably, we may be described as in a state of "grace" in the degree that the "sacrament," or ennobling process, works throughout a given community towards a harmony of personalities, purified and fortified, informed and valorous, imaginative and creative. To this end the eucharistic sacrament is specially designed. It is however but the master-instrument in a whole body of sacraments, sanctified and, therefore living, activities, contrived for supplementary work in the human cycle that turns from birth to death. Their general purpose works by the attempting of a transformation from an animal equipped with a quite inadequate output of instincts into an adult human being endowed with a working equipment of moral impulses, idealizing aspirations and corresponding creative endeavours. In theoretical terms the purpose is (a) conversion from an ungracious animalism and its perversions, and other temptations and allurements (i.e. state of sin), (b) to maintain the state of grace as an habitual mode of conduct, (c) continuously to elevate and idealize this state of grace towards varying "perfections" in desire, thought and conduct. Accept this secular version of the eucharistic ideal as, so far, descriptive of its doctrine and ritual, then the statement that Catholic theology, like other religious systems of historic achievement, contains a "sociology" or theory (pure and applied) of man's origin, development and purpose, deterioration, renewal and ennoblement, hardly needs further demonstration. And questions that arise as to degrees of verifiability in theory, and efficiency in practice, are irrelevant to the present issue.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES.

INTERMEDIATE, both historically and in mode of procedure, between the "sociologies" of religious systems and those of modern scientific provenance, are the theories of man's origin and development, purpose and social organisation, which emanate from political philosophy. It would be more correct to say political philosophies, for the contributions of those who, for more than two thousand years, have observed, reflected and speculated in this field have never been articulated into an accepted and expanding system. Nevertheless, common aspects impart a fairly definite character to the pro-sociologies of political philosophy. For their validity they rely upon chains of abstract reasoning, and the "principles" that issue therefrom. And for practical application, these political philosophies rely upon deductions from their "principles." Their imperatives of action derive

from indicatives that are logical abstractions. The representative methods of political philosophy thus contrast with those of a social science which must needs proceed by systematic observations of fact and their comparison for the purpose of classification, with its resulting tentative generalisations which await verification before acceptance, and consequent possibility of practical application.

A FEW illustrations will disclose the characteristic views of the social process that emerge from political philosophies. In Plato's *Republic* the ideal polity is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of "Justice." And as the nature of justice is assumed to be discoverable by dialectic argument, so is the ideal polity likewise. And incidentally may be noted the pitfalls into which the dialectical method may plunge even the clearest, most logical and ablest of thinkers. For the communal or state-system of marriage, which Plato commends to the Rulers in his ideal State, has been revealed by modern anthropology as a common character of certain barbarous or degenerate tribes.

HOWEVER divergent in appearance, yet in type of speculative thought, the *Leviathan* of Hobbes is in the same tradition as Plato's *Republic*. And Hobbes, drawing upon the travellers' tales of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, as well as the legends of antiquity, contrived that picture of aboriginal man's life as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," which still holds the popular imagination. But again modern anthropology comes to the rescue, and explicates what is true in this sweeping abstraction which claims authenticity as an account of social origins. As the anthropologist sees him, the aboriginal man of Hobbes is a variant of the richly diverse hunting type, and, moreover, in all probability a degenerate form. Again, there is Hobbes' theory of man's rise from savagery through barbarism into civilisation. That progress consists essentially in an ascent through tribal and other stages of political organisation, which culminate in the modern State of "constitutional" pattern. This theory of political and social progress, as elaborated by Hobbes, had, to be sure, an ancestry going back to the Greek thought of antiquity. And under various disguises and modifications it survives to-day (implicit or explicit) at the foundation of each and every organised political party.

To its outfit of traditional abstractions, accepted as valid generalisations, recent and current political philosophy has added others from the reflections of more recent thinkers. Thus the idea of a "general will," discoverable by democratic methods and made to prevail through the agency of "representative institutions" was, if not invented yet popularised, by Rousseau. And schemes of Government based on these assumptions held the public ear of Western Civilisation, almost unchallenged till but the other day. True it is that within

the limits of these preconceptions there have been rival schools widely divergent in thought and action. From the academic wells of Classic Economics issued the political school of *Laissez-faire*, which viewed the general welfare as dependent on a minimising of control by State Governments and a maximising of unrestrained liberty by individuals and voluntary groups. The contrary doctrine of securing the general welfare by enlarging the sphere of State regulation has gained increasing vogue with the rise and popularisation of socialist economics. But these rival doctrines rest alike upon a pro-sociology which accepts the concepts of "Individual" and "State" as elemental data. Nevertheless these twin concepts, submitted to analysis by specialised sciences such as psychology, social pathology and anthropology (which have grown up in a more concrete tradition than that of politics and economics), have been revealed as baffling complexities far from yet exhausted by scientific investigation.

IN the critical purview of current psychology, the individual is seen to be compounded of strangely divergent elements seldom composed into a unity that merits the title of personality. Central to the individual mind is an animal core, loaded with atavistic tendencies of reversion to animalism and savagery, but also quick with the potencies of human achievement even to the creations of genius. Around this core of animal life are confusedly mingled layers of fragments from the fine products of historic cultures and from their decaying refuse. Asked what are the circumstances of ancestry and birth, life, education and career, which determine the individual's development towards human perfections or deterioration to their opposites and perversions, the psychologist is as yet ready with but provisional answers, though of increasing range and verifiability as students of other specialised studies bring their resources to bear. The biologist, for instance, stresses heredity as furnishing latencies of energy or inertia, but he insists on the importance of environment, both natural and social, and the individual's interplay therewith as evoking and developing, or repressing and perverting, the talents of birth. Again the anthropologist confirms a tradition of medicine, and of common sense, in emphasising the influence, often a determining influence, of occupation in the make-up of the individual mind. And there is growing up an anthropology which sees, in the elemental occupations of hunting, fishing, mining, woodcraft, herding and agriculture, not only the primary factors of civilisation, but also perennial sources whence each generation must needs renew, by direct experience, qualities and aptitudes of mind that are essential to the making of personality.

THE NEED OF SPECIALISED STUDIES.

THE above contributions of psychology and anthropology are but sample approaches to a genuinely sociological understanding of the

human phenomena generalised under one political philosophy as the Individual standing superior to the State, and, under another system, as the same Individual but now subordinated to the State. A similar array of specialised studies, generalised as sociology, is manifestly needed for concrete grasp of the manifold realities underlying that political abstraction, the State. It should be clear that a similar process of specialised analysis and generalised sociology has to be applied to all the other large and pervasive social concepts of everyday experience such as Church and Communicants, City and Citizens, Nation and Nationals, Association and Members, Party and Partisans. Each of these paired concepts embodies a tradition and a doctrine, with relevant dogmas of affirmation and rules of action, all of which may be traced to social origins. They each and all arise from experience and reflection upon it; they consequently assert or imply a view of the life-process and the social-process more or less verifiable.

Thus may be discerned a wide range and variety of approaches and perspectives, each with its own predominance, and usually to the omission or belittling of others. Yet we are driven to search for an element of truth in every pro-sociology. And, alike for order in thought, and harmony in action, we have to elicit some general plan, and thus unite the apparent mazes and labyrinths of society into a lucid and orderly science, which shall yield an increasing understanding of social life. The material of sociology exists in the lives and records of communities, past, present and future. And recalling that the everyday facts and views of the newspaper, and the half-charted fields of observation and reflection in Libraries and Universities (as well as religious and political systems), are social products expressing, at every stage of enumeration and mastery of detail, the diverse concepts and ideals of different communities, we are confronted with the immense task of co-ordinating and harmonising them all. From each of these diverse pro-sociologies we must evidently learn, if we would attain to some truly scientific sociology.

HERE, as at so many other points, we may perceive how sociology must rest upon and grow out of biology, yet pass beyond and transcend it. Bird, beast and flower come to maturity by living to the full the life of their species. Must it not be the same with man? To know the doctrine one must lead the life is an undisputed maxim of ancient religion. Let the sociologist follow that clue, and it will do more than carry him as a sympathetic observer into every camp of the social field. It will demand from him a willing participation in the characteristic activities of each grouping. To be sure, social science, even more than other sciences, requires a high cultivation of detachment in observation, theory and experiment. But just as biology exists for its own sake, yet also has a higher (because more human) purpose in

its applications to medicine, hygiene and agriculture ; so social science has its supreme justification in social service. If every group, whether organised for business or politics, education or religion, art, industry or science, were leavened by individuals informed by an adequate sociology, and, without disloyalty to associates, moved to view their group activity as social service, then would the future of humanity rest upon a more assured basis.

THE SOCIAL HERITAGE.

A MAIN obstacle to that attainment is the long-standing confusion of our social heritage and our organic heredity. Failure to clarify this demarcation has been, and is, a prime hindrance to the growth of sociology. Without a clear working idea of the Social Heritage, itself the central concept of their science, sociologists drift into hopeless entanglements with biologists on one side and psychologists on the other ; while both the latter constantly poach upon sociological preserves without being aware of having crossed their own boundaries. Consider for instance the contrast of voice and language. The former, being our animal cry and note, is part of our biological inheritance, individualised and, no doubt, complicated by psychological influences. But language is a distinctive social heritage which we receive from our predecessors and in turn pass on to successors. Or again, it is obvious that hunger and passion are organic, but the social complexities, into which our elaborations of these biological traits impel us, are manifestly for the sociologist to enquire into, to be sure, with needed aid from the psychologist. For final illustration take the race-theories recently so conspicuous and still widely accepted. Such race theories, so far as they have any scientific foundation at all, are obviously of biological breeds, to be carefully distinguished from the social heritages of culture often mendaciously imputed to them.

THE SOCIAL PROCESS AND ITS LIFE-THEORY.

SOCIOLOGY has suffered a long arrest, and even decline, for lack of a life-theory to link it into a working partnership with biology and psychology, and thereby afford firm support for the superstructure of its own specialisms. The labours of Comte (1798-1857), and Spencer (1820-1903), in this field have as yet borne little fruit, for though magistral they were premature. There can, however, be no doubt that the work of Comte has been inadequately quarried by the body of sociologists. And the same be said of the other main founder of the science, Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882), but with a qualification. The latter generalised a life-time of travel for observation into a famous formula. And Le Play's great generalisation, *Lieu, Travail, Famille* (conveniently translated as Place, Work, Folk), has, in the hands of a

naturalist and a thinker (Patrick Geddes, 1854-), pushing through from biology into sociology, supplied the basis for a working theory of life at once organic, psychic and social. True, it is that this Le Play-Geddes theory has so far penetrated but slightly into academic circles, nevertheless it is probably a destined instrument for coming generations of sociologists, trained in naturalist-like methods of observation, to check the arrest of their science and renew it on a rising spiral. However that may be, the assertion can be made without fear of contradiction that this Le Play-Geddes theory holds the field as a reasoned account, capable of detailed application, of the life-process as it operates in the plant and animal world, in the human mind and in social evolution.

THE long delay of so necessary an achievement needs to be explained. There are many causes. One is the continuing duel between mechanists and vitalists in biology; another is the addiction of scientifically-trained psychologists to the observation and measurement of physiological processes underlying mental ones; another is the persistence of a dialectical bias amongst sociologists, tending to substitute the social philosopher for the man of science. But more inhibitory perhaps than anyone of these causes has been the historic side-tracking of the main issue, by that will o' the wisp, the Organicist Metaphor. The ablest amongst a whole generation of sociologists, from Spencer and Schäffle to Worms, gave themselves to an elaboration of the ancient analogy (perceived by Greek thinkers and noted by St. Paul) between a society and an organism. They built up their studies of this analogy by comparisons of organic structures and functions with the forms and institutions of human societies. Assuredly the far more real and valuable comparison is that between the kindred and parallel life-processes of an organism and a society.

THOUGH a certain use of technical terms, and a recourse to the abbreviations of scientific formulæ, can hardly be avoided in outlining the Le Play-Geddes theory, yet its essential character is intelligibly simple, as a couple of illustrations may show. Think, for instance, of the Dutch delta. It would be hard to conceive an environment less amenable to human achievement than this land of flooding rivers, tidal storms, and indeed much of it below sea-level. Yet man reacting upon that forbidding environment with increasing mastery has created a record of achievement in art and industry, in government and commerce, in science and philosophy, that touches the summit of history. Interacting with an environment of quite different, but not less formidable difficulties, the Swiss people have marched from triumph to triumph in political organisation, economic progress and educational attainment. Here then are examples of life's interplay with environment, whereby each is alternately hammer and anvil to the other, yet human purpose proves the winning factor.

THE LIFE-PROCESS AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS.

TURNING now from geographic and social to biological concepts, one notes that however sharp be the controversy of Mechanists and Vitalists, yet both sides are in substantial agreement as to the fundamental nature of life. They concur in regarding the life-process as a twofold interaction between environment and organism. Life proceeds by an alternation in which environment acts upon organism, and in turn organism reacts upon environment. Life is, as it were, passive when environment conditions organism; and for illustration take the action of heat, oxygen, or water, all of which have their definite effects on the organism. But life may be viewed as active when organism reacts on environment changing it in turn; witness the differences between inspired and expired air. Such action and reaction are alike termed function (which, for short, we may write "f"). Here then are three elemental concepts whose interplay gives us a working definition of Life; and since social life and mental life are parts of life in general, we are on the way to track out the parallelism and interaction of their processes. What we want for the unknown X of life is a formula of definite relations. Towards its composition take the initial letters of the two elemental concepts, environment and organism, using capitals or small letters, where each is respectively active or passive. Then, for the unknown X of Life, we can compose an equation of mathematical precision. Thus:

$$X = E \longrightarrow f \longrightarrow o : O \longrightarrow f \longrightarrow e$$

or briefly

$$L \text{ (Life)} = Efo : Of e$$

and the same interaction of environment and organism, alternately active and passive, may be expressed as a ratio:

$$L = \frac{Efo}{Of e}$$

PROCEED now to consider human life; and not merely in its animal and organic aspect with the physiologists, but in its social aspect, and from simplest to most civilised. Far apart though these may seem, there is again no denial that man in social life is manifestly in some degree conditioned by his environment, geographical and other; nor yet that at every level of civilisation he spends activity upon this environment in turn, utilising and adapting it to his purpose, and so far therefore dominating it. So plain is each of these half-aspects of life, that it has been insisted on by turns, and even to the excessive subordination of the other: witness, for the dominance of man by his environment, the teaching of writers from Montesquieu to Buckle; and conversely numberless are the historians and biographers who stress the mastery of circumstance by personalities and groups.

To formulate these complementary aspects, call our human Environment, our Place, "P" (active), or "p" (passive); and our human grouping, our folk, "F" (active), or "f" (passive). And since, in a forest-place, man must hunt or starve; on the plain, plough or starve; and, by the waters or on the sea, either fish or starve, this pressure of place on folk is best summarised as WORK ("W"). The Place thus inexorably *works* the folk: yet throughout history we observe that the Folk increasingly *work* the place. Parallel to the formula of organic life we can now construct that of social life:

"X" of Organic Life =

$$E \longrightarrow F \longrightarrow O : O \longrightarrow F \longrightarrow E = E F O : O F E$$

"X" of Social Life =

$$P \longrightarrow W \longrightarrow f : F \longrightarrow W \longrightarrow p = P W f : F W p$$

THE latter, it will be seen, is Le Play's formula adapted to the two-fold aspect of social life as alternately passive and active. Here then the parallelism of the biological and social sciences emerges clearly. And it will be noted that, definitely and from the outset, the aberrations of the "organicist" doctrine are avoided, since we are not searching for analogies between an organism and a society, but simply parallelising the process of organic life with that of society.

INDEED the formulæ suggest, as it were by mere inspection, a new encyclopædic survey, that of the interpretations of life throughout history, and it aids us to clarify and arrange them. On the left side (Efo and Pwf) we perceive the determination of life by circumstances, and on the right (Ofe and Fwp) the domination of circumstances by life. The one view sees Life bowed before inexorable Fate, submissive to impassive Gods; the other shows Life overthrowing Titans, accomplishing heroic labours. Similarly with the world-religions and their contrasted heresies and sects: so too with philosophic schools; and the economic and geographic interpretations of history find place on one side, and on the other its ethical, religious and æsthetic interpretations. The demands of Determinism and Freedom are thus met and harmonised.

IF such claims seem extravagant for a formula which is no more than an orderly presentment of vital postulates, that may be is because, distracted by the multifarious specialisms of science, impressed by the large abstractions of philosophy, and elevated by the soaring flights of religion, we are apt to lose touch with the simple realities of life. And the slow growth of sociology, and its arrest, whatever other causes may have been at work, are no doubt associated with the same tendency of thought in its elaborations to drift away from the axiomatic data of life. Sociology, in order to take rank with the established sciences, must therefore not only maintain, through all refinements and generalisations, its grasp of vital essentials, but must

also aid, and even direct, its own increasing group of specialisms to well-correlated activities within the definable domain of life.

GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMICS AND ANTHROPOLOGY.

To illustrate this vitalising and integrating function of sociology in relation to the more specialised studies of man and his environment, recur to the Place, Work, Folk (P w f), which makes the first half of our social formula. It will be agreed that the study of place is what we know as Geography, that of work as Economics, and that of folk as Anthropology; and that each of these sub-sciences has its specialised groups of investigators and teachers, in their learned societies, their university departments. Yet it will be admitted that each of the three pursues its own course without organised co-operation with the other two. They have as yet advanced mainly as dis-specialised groups, *i.e.*, each conceived with its subject substantially distinct, and so as isolated from the others. And, consequently, the studies of each have been largely confined to the static aspects of their phenomena. Hence it is that the geographer's main contribution is his atlas, essentially of earth-forms: "Geo-morphology." And since Folk, apart from place and work are dead, the anthropologist's main achievements have been chiefly in archæology, racial anatomy, craniology, ethnography, &c., and among tools, especially weapons: indeed, anthropology has for the most part concentrated on the collection and arrangement, description and discussion, of Museum specimens. While, as to Economists, long indifferent as they have been to local conditions and to concrete human life, their "Place" has been vaguely abstracted as "the Market"; and their "Folk" similarly abstracted into "Labour" and "Capital," and with ready assurance of "immutable laws" accordingly, as of "Supply and Demand." Inevitably therefore these economic abstractions have failed to carry much conviction to minds of either physical or biological training, much less of evolutionary or other idealistic trend.

Yet no doubt the geographer, at his best of course, and as traveller, sets forth for us the conditions of economic activity, and of human types; the anthropologist, too, is increasingly active in the living human field; and even the economist goes occasionally into the open. Still, these three sciences are as yet far from integrated. But in the above presentation they are integrated on schema, as in life, by means of their elemental chord of Place, work, folk, into a single, and henceforth unified, field of study. That study, as it develops, is our elementary sociology. A Sociological Society in fact largely arises, as geographers, economists, and anthropologists begin to come together, and correlate their respective contributions as aspects of the life-process of a region or village, town or city. It should matter not whether the community concerned be more or less simple, as in Polynesia, or industrialised, as in England or the U.S.A.

FURTHERMORE, with this union of these three studies in their social unison—their coming into real life, in short—Psychology at once claims and obtains a hearing. The geographer has always observed his place with senses alert. The anthropologist, as he leaves his museum collections for direct studies of man in his natural surroundings, is roused to sympathetic feeling and insight accordingly. And the economist is nowadays far less insistent upon his tradition of utilitarian hedonism—a doctrine defunct for all extant schools of psychology—and more open to experience, directly obtained from the various kinds of work which confront him. Our formula has thus its parallel psychological side :

Place	Work	Folk
.....
Sense	Experience	Feeling

To the everyday material Acts of life, we have thus added its everyday mental Facts. We see the simple working household, village or town, with its accompanying communal elements of mental life, in which every child is developing towards mature participation in the tradition and habits of its community, and apart moreover from formal schooling of literate character.

NOTE, also, that this simple graphic presentment puts explicitly the "materialistic" view of the psychologic process. Life, so far as we have yet gone, is, in technical phrasing, Bio-psychosis. Its human sense, experience and feeling—seen and charted in outline and in principle so far—are but environmental, functional and organismal, just as for the simpler animal life. In Huxley's phrase, this psychologic aspect of life, is plainly but "epi-phenomenal."

THE HIGHER PSYCHOLOGY.

GEOGRAPHY, Economics and Anthropology having thus emerged as sub-sciences (with their simple psychology of the more passive mental processes) awaiting integration through the office of a truly vital sociology ; we have next to ask what sub-sciences arise from the view of life active and creative revealed in the second half (F w p) of our formula conceived as an organon of sociological research. What room does it find for the idealising emotion, the constructive idea, the creative imagination, and how does it deal with the combining of these mental processes into purpose, plan and design, with the resulting achievements, personal, social historic. Here we have to do with traditional studies such as Politics, Ethics, Psychology (in its investigation of the higher mental processes), and Aesthetics, all of which have long been refractory to sociology. But if these studies, without

challenge to their relative independence, also can be brought within the co-ordinating activities of a sociology working within definite categories of the life-process, than a great step towards unity is taken.

PICTURE again the mapping of the life-process, the mental process and social process as already outlined, and try next how much further forward this analysis and recomposition can be carried. First there is the simple world of our ordinary outward conditions and activities ; those of place, work and people, interacting to compose what we may call the simple objective life of everyday Acts. Mirroring this objective, or out-world, there is the everyday mental, or inner life of sense, experience, feeling, each derived in large measure direct from the corresponding place, work, people. Hence a simple and everyday inner world of Facts, which is, as it were, objective-subjective. But beyond the common life of acts and facts, with their related family and group feelings, there may come a stirring and awakening of the inner mental life to great issues. Feelings deepen, expand, intensify ; they crystallise anew even into great human emotions. Thus love arises and outgrows all former limits of person, family, tribe. Human ties are touched to idealism and poetry. So develop new groupings, with their allegiances, loyalties, devotions. Again, beyond young dreams of love and patriotism may appear the higher and more permanent idealisations we call religious and mystic. So, too, ordinary work-experience of everyday life may develop those intellectual qualities of order and sequence we call science ; they may even reach out to the all-embracing generalities of philosophy. Again, too, our simple sense-impressions may be amplified and transformed into that vivid imagery which characterises the poet's dream, the artist's vision, the mystic's apocalypse.

A PRECISE and—so to speak—technical nomenclature has to be contrived for these higher and deeper operations of the mind. What, to begin with, are we to call the transformation (or "sublimation") of natural and elemental folk-feeling into a new and intenser emotion of communal life. There seems, strangely enough, to be no established psychological term. It has been proposed to use Emotion, in that definite sense ; various though be its meanings in current psychology. For the other two complementary processes of the deeper mental life, there need be no difficulty about terms ; and in summary, we have :

(Folk) Feeling transformed into Emotion


(Work) Experience transformed into Ideation

(Place) Sense transformed into Imagination

OF these three transformations we recognise the first as the very essence of that religious "conversion" which characterises not only the saint and the martyr, but is also widely evidenced throughout the

spiritual experience of adolescence alike in savage and civilised peoples. The sociological suggestion inevitably arises of viewing each of the above three transformations (or sublimations), as the respective phases of one comprehensive "conversion" needed for a full and integrated personality. For, just as the unity of Place-Work-People makes the elemental chord of the objective life, and as its psychologic correlate of Sense-Experience-Feeling makes the elemental chord of the simple subjective life, so this further triad of Emotion-Ideation-Imagination is the single chord of a fuller, richer and unified development of the inner life. Thereby our simple everyday endowment of common-sense-experience-feeling becomes raised to that high quality and intensity of being for which are needed, in every language, its terms of spirit, even of soul; since in this way the spirit wakes, the soul attains.

THE idealising emotion, the constructive thinking, the creative imagination, being thus exhibited as the characteristic chord of an inner life which is formative of personality, we may claim that Ethics, Psychology (in its deeper sense), and Aesthetics fall into place as three sub-sciences of sociology in its actively subjective phase. Let us then resume in a single schema the presentment above of sociology as a study contrived to integrate; (a) the Place, Work, Folk respectively of Geography, Economics and Anthropology: (b) of Sense, Experience, Feeling, as the primary data of elementary psychology: (c) the Emotion, Ideation and Imagination respectively of Ethics, the higher Psychology, and Aesthetics.




THE SOCIAL PROCESS AS CREATIVE.

THIS schema manifestly lacks the fourth and final quartering of the social shield. Its first quartering, the objective field of everyday acts is followed by the associated subjective field of everyday facts. But from this simplest mental life (which is a more developed form of what is discernible in the higher animals around us), we pass, in the third quartering, to the deeper inner chord of creative mental life. Must not this also have its objective expression? And if so, of no less orderly and intelligible character?

START again with the religious approach. Assuredly every great initiator has had his retreat, to wilderness, forest or hermitage—in short, his own cloister of meditation; and he has impressed this need,

this duty, upon his disciples ; indeed, sometimes only too fully, as the history of asceticism, and of the cloistered life, so largely show. Yet as initiator, he must emerge from his retreat ; he comes forth into the world ; and, with a new and full intensity of emotional appeal, he forms his group of disciples. A new type of community is thus born ; no mere folk-group, but an *élite*, of it matters not what folk-origins : the essential bond being "not according to the flesh, but to the spirit." This new type of group thus needs a type-name. And since the bond is essentially ethical, and of social purpose, we may call the new grouping an Etho-Polity. Its inspiring moral purpose unites it around its leader, indeed often all the more strongly when his bodily presence passes away ; since his influence remains, and even grows. The Etho-Polity thus increases, and acts upon the social world, bringing over new members from the folk into its fold.

As Emotion arouses Ideation, and even to a Synthesis of its ideas, so the Etho-Polity in action must be an intimately co-operative association for which we may use the term Synergy. And towards what ? Towards realising in actual life and in its material environment, the emotioned and ideated Imagery of its founder and inspirer, and assuredly towards concrete Achievement. Our thought-system in the cloister was in a real sense but one of day-"dreams," as indeed folk in the everyday world are ever wont to call them : but now these dreams take form, in deeds. Thus in final summary :



OUR schema is now in principle completed. The inner thought—as emotioned ideated imagery—projects itself into the outer world : a New Society is born. The religion has entered upon its mission : its history develops accordingly. In the familiar everyday world, place and work essentially control the folk, constrain them to their everyday economic life, their common experience and feeling accordingly. But now the situation is fully reversed ; the new Etho-Polity, in its active synergy, if it does not completely attain unto achievement, at least sets out for this purpose, as for its "Promised Land," its "Kingdom of Heaven upon earth." From the simply organo-psychic life, in which environment essentially dominates organism, we have passed onwards and upwards to the psych-organic life, dominating environment despite its difficulties. Here at length emerges a simple formulation of life in evolution towards its highest expressions.

THE REGIONAL SURVEY.

IN recent times especially, it is customary to identify this final chord of affirmative life, social and personal (viewed as a harmony of Etho-Polity, Synergy and its Achievement), not only with religion, but even more with the State and its Policy, with organised movements of progressive endeavour, and thus with the aims and purposes of the larger citizenship. How far, then, can we claim that Politics, Social Service and Civics are hereby brought within the integrating rôle of sociology pure and applied? The answer will depend upon the competence of sociologists to describe and interpret the most complex activities and largest aspirations of contemporary civilisations. Does their theory of the social process afford them an equipment adapted to this purpose? The answer is, literally, *solvitur ambulando*. The sociologist (if his study is to continue, complete and crown the circle of the sciences) must follow the field naturalist into the open, and make, as he walks through town and country, the observations which are at once his raw material and the test of his theory. It is here that the young but growing movement known as Regional Survey has its place as a sociological apparatus adjusted to field studies. It becomes, therefore, necessary to enquire into the use of Regional Surveys as a means of applying the fourfold theory of the social process to open-air observations and their interpretations.

FROM the geographer is, of course, derived the basal unit of regional survey, indeed the fundamental conception on which its whole superstructure is reared. Describing the river valley with the geographer, the regional surveyor learns his first lesson in method and notation. From mountain source to sea he travels on foot, making in the open air, and in face of the phenomena themselves, such observations as he may, but always on the essential condition of the geographer, viz., the actual mapping of his observations in such wise that the next surveyor may verify or correct the matter and the location of the data.

THE river basin, the conventional unit of regional geography, to be sure, needed modification to adapt it to the requirements of the regional survey. Such modification it received through the usage of three other branches of natural science. The true unit of the regional survey is the geographer's valley section, to which there has been added respectively by geologist, naturalist, and anthropologist, each in his own notation, first the economic geology, next the corresponding vegetation, and finally the elemental occupations congruent with local deposits or flora. The schematic presentment of his geographical unit becomes thus, for the regional surveyor, the valley section with miner at the mountain pockets, woodman and hunter in the forests of the mountain slopes, shepherd on the upland grass, peasant on the lowland alluvial, and fisher at river mouth. In the survey of these elemental occupations, first as sources of livelihood,

and secondly as foundations of family life and social formation, the guidance must be sought successively of economist and anthropologist. In short, the geographic survey must be followed by the economic and anthropologic surveys of the river valley. The surveyor will have no difficulty in selecting for himself among the various schools of economists. He will naturally turn to that which habitually maps its data, and from this—the school of Booth and Rowntree in England—he will take the working-class family as his economic unit. In this selection he will be confirmed by the anthropologists, for these increasingly start their observations of social phenomena with the family. The schematisation of miner, forester, hunter, shepherd, peasant, and fisher, as no mere formula of a vague anthropological development, but each one of the series a type of perennial occupational, on its respective level of the normal valley section, is based on the vast researches of Frédéric Le Play, whose work is summed in the initiative formula of Place, Work, Folk, which, as we have seen, links the social process of life with its organic process.

THE HISTORIC SURVEY.

THE second phase of a systematic open-air survey is the historical one. The dominant contemporary school of documentary historians cannot help us greatly in the field. Much though we must owe to them in the privacy of the study, yet they do not afford us either method, notation, or formula such as are needed to make the historical survey continuous, and commensurate with that of the geographic, economic, and anthropologic survey. Our start must be rather with the archaeologists, for these are themselves increasingly field workers, and it is natural, therefore, that they should be engaged upon the compilation of a human record directly continuous with the geological record.

IN archaeological mood, the sociologist retraverses his river valley, and in detail explores the architecture of its hamlets and villages, towns and cities. The geographic panorama is again before us, but now as the stage of a drama in time. We have to re-read the story of its villages, towns and cities from past to present, or present to past. The archaeologist helps with our reading and interpretation of buildings, ruins, monuments, and other material survivals. The folklorist with the history of manners and customs, and the biographer, the local historian, and guide-book need all to be utilised. Thus, throughout the river valley, the tombs reveal their secrets and the pageant of the past is played again.

BUT some schematised presentment of regional history has to be devised in order to establish that comparison of one regional unit with another, which is of the very essence of scientific history. Moreover, such schematisation of regional history implies a corresponding treatment—in method and notation—of the general history of Western civilisation.

For regional history remains, to be sure, a relatively meaningless set of annals, except by reference to the larger issues of national and general history. Where may we find the clues for this study?

WITH the political historian the sociologist takes account of the histories of dynasties, states, wars, constitutions, legislations; with the economic historian the narrative of markets, prices, wages, workshops, transportation, the life of the labourer, and so forth; with the students of *Kulturgeschichte*, the history of drama and the fine arts, of language and literature, of science and philosophy. And, finally, he does not forget the historians of religious life and institutions. Here are four well-marked groups of historical investigators, whose collective labours broadly cover the whole field of study.

FOR our needed synthetic formula we turn to Comte, who, utilising the labours of his three chief predecessors, Montesquieu (1689-1755), Vico (1688-1744), and Condorcet (1743-94), reached and set forth in generality and in much detail a clear conception of civilisation as a drama of four main parts, whose records are respectively, the four kinds of history we have noted above; political, economic, cultural and religious. For the protagonists of these four main parts in the drama, Comte proposed the names respectively of Chiefs, People, Intellectuals, and Emotionals. In the ceaselessly diversified groupings and re-groupings of those—in co-operation or in competition—there are two combinations which tend to greater permanence. They are the coming together into common organisation of, on the one hand, the Chiefs and the People, and on the other the Intellectuals and the Emotionals. The first of these two combinations Comte generalised as the Temporal Power, and the second as the Spiritual Power, of each historic phase. Thus the main drama of history is seen as an interplay of temporal and spiritual powers, or, in moral aspect, a perennial endeavour to balance into a working co-adjustment the impulses and ideals respectively of dominance and of influence. Given then the abiding interplay of temporal and spiritual powers, the historian of this school discerns and works out the ever-renewing minor dramas, of the People co-operating with, or contending against, the Chiefs; of the Intellectuals with or against the Emotionals; the diverse interaction of all these four social types; and the resulting changes in architecture and city design, in government and religion, in the arts and industries, philosophies and sciences.

THE regional sociologist, adopting Comte's formula, carries it with him in his itinerant field studies, not only of cities, but of towns, and even of villages, and uses it as a working model of social life in each of its characteristic historic phases. Thus reconstructing the mediæval phase from its surviving buildings, ruins, and monuments, its social types and customs, he will see the Chiefs in their castles, the People in their guildhouses and town halls, the Intellectuals, or Regulars, in

their abbeys, and the Emotionals, or Seculars, in their parish churches and cathedrals. The castle and town hall of the temporal power, the cloister and cathedral of the spiritual power, reached, in the mediæval city, an architectural perfection and a social co-adjustment which give to that historic period a particular significance for sociology. And all communities are to be interpreted, so the Comtean hypothesis assumes, as arrestments or developments of this four-fold social life, with its bipolar tendency to focus on temporal dominance or on spiritual influence. Passing, for instance, from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, we see the castle becoming the palace, while the abbey and its scriptorium are replaced in intellectual functionings by the college with its library; so that in palace and college the "gentleman" and the "scholar" appear as characteristic types of chiefs and intellectuals, dominating their epoch and profoundly disturbing the previous balance of temporal and spiritual powers.

FOR notation, we have to devise a scheme that will do for the historic survey what the valley section, developed from the relief and vegetation map, did for the geographic, economic and anthropologic survey. The familiar graphic chart of historic annals, with its space for time method, will furnish the ground-plan for each epoch, and this must then be divided and coloured suitably to represent the phases of the temporal and spiritual power with their changing types of people, chiefs, intellectuals, and emotionals, and the corresponding architectural and institutional changes. This abstract charting of the course of history throughout the periods in the region of our survey should, of course, be supplemented by historic maps and plans, and by a photographic survey developed to such elaborateness as may be. All difficulties about periods and their sub-divisions may be evaded in the first instance by taking the following scheme which fairly summarises current usage amongst historians of Western Civilisation.

THESE are as follows :

Ancient	{ Primitive Matriarchal Patriarchal
Recent	{ Greco-Roman Mediæval Renaissance
Contemporary	{ ? ? ?
Incipient	{ ? ? ?

As to the phases of Contemporary Western Civilisation, divergence of opinion prevents attempts here to substitute definite statement for the marks of interrogation; and the same applies in even greater degree to the characterisation of Incipient phases.

THE VITAL SURVEY.

So far we have studied both individuals and communities as types rather than as personalities. Miner, woodman, hunter, shepherd, peasant, fisher, and their communities are rustic types—connecting links between Nature and man. People, chiefs, intellectuals, emotionals, and their social groupings are civic types—carriers of that social heritage of civilisation which puts man above and beyond Nature. Through the social heritage of religion and polity, science and philosophy, art and literature, accumulated in the passage of generations, man dominates Nature in himself and his environment. In the succession of generations, civilisation is alternately cause and effect of this mastery. Its supreme and most abiding expression is in the building and maintenance of cities and the fulness of citizenship. But the life which is in Nature, in rustic man, and in civic man, is one and continuous. It is life in evolution. Throughout this evolution there is a rhythm of relative passivity and activity of life to environment—of man to Nature—in which increase of the relatively active factor is assumed as the criterion of ascent in development. The tendency of life to dominate circumstance has its flower of personality in individuals, and also in communities, which latter we may call social or civic personality. The observation and interpretation of these unique expressions of life, individual and social, is the very crux of sociology.

HERE (to change the metaphor) is the *pons asmorum* over which the specialist must pass in his passage from the sub-sciences of sociology into that field of generalised science which co-ordinates them all. Here a theory of the life-process which professes to embrace also the mental process and the social process must find its supreme test and application.

RECUR to the life-theory above stated, and recall that the Place, Work, Folk of everyday Acts makes the milieu in which each of us lives in a state relatively passive to environment and tradition. A technical name for this milieu is wanted. For that purpose the word "Town" has been used to cover alike the rural and urban varieties of such an environment and tradition. Now the Acts which, in an objective sense, make up the "Town" life of an individual relatively passive to environment and tradition impose their reflections upon his mind as Facts, derived from Sense-impressions (mainly of Place), Experience (mainly of Work) and Feelings (essentially of Folk). These mental states (which go far to determine the individual's habits of mind)

viewed from the standpoint of community, need a technical name. To employ the word School for that purpose is but to give precision to a term of traditional origin and application antedating its literary usage. Thus Town and School become technical terms of sociology. The first indicates the formative milieu (Place, Work, Folk) of each individual's objective everyday life; and the second does the same service for his subjective everyday life (of sense, experience, feeling). To the outer or objective world of Acts in the Town there corresponds the inner or subjective world of Facts in the Town's School. Further, the nomenclature of sociology demands two pairs of words, which, while corresponding, (a) to the Acts and Facts of individual life, and (b) to the Town and School of Social life, shall indicate with precision, (c) those changes whereby the passive sense-experience-feeling of everyday Facts may be transformed into the active "Dream" inspired by the emotion-ideation-imagination of a creative inner life; and (d) the resultant Deeds which collectively reshape environment and remould tradition in accordance with the purpose of the transformed inner life. For this needed pair of technical terms socially corresponding to the "Dreams" and "Deeds" of individual life, it is not easy to find acceptable words. But again by giving precision and some modification to a couple of traditional terms the words Cloister and City have been introduced. Cloister, in this general and technical sense, implies, of course, some social organisation which (like Academe and Lyceum of Classical antiquity, Monastery of the Middle Ages, or University of modern times) seeks to evoke and unify the idealising emotion, the constructive thought, the creative imagination. Similarly, in a sociological sense, City indicates at once, (a) those high and intensive civic organs such as Acropolis, or Forum, or Cathedral or Town Hall, which, at their best, give practical expression in public life to the high aspirations of the inner life; and at the same time, (b) the correlative concrete expressions of the good, the true, the beautiful in Homes and Institutions throughout a community.

Thus in summary we have the following variations of the original Efo

formula Ofe of the life-process, adaptable to that of the individual and

	Acts	Deeds
his community. For the individual our scheme is	Facts	Dreams
which we may call the formula of Personality; and for the community		

	Town	City
(rural and urban) the scheme is	School	Cloister

—which we may call the civic formula. By systematic use of these formulæ primarily for observation in the open-air, in travels through town and country, but also, of course, for reading, reflection, discussion, in study-closet and in classroom, the sociologist comes into his own proper province. He passes from the Regional Survey of rustic types and their urban

variants and institutions up and down the river valley ; and from the Historic Survey of all the filiated phases that run through the course of each civilisation ; from these two preliminary surveys the sociologist comes to his two-fold Vital Survey of the life-process as it works in the individuals and the communities of his own contemporary order.

To illustrate now the illumination shed by this vital survey upon the preliminary studies, regional and historic, two remarks need only be made. In the Rustic types of the rural survey it is the left hand, or determinist, side of the personal and civic formulæ that is mainly operative. In the historic survey we see both sides of the formulæ at work, and we emphasise the one aspect or the other as we study respectively the history of the People and their temporal Rulers, and that of religions, arts, philosophies, sciences. For manifestly the historic formula of Comte can be written

People	Emotionals	when at once it is seen to be on all fours
Chiefs	Intellectuals	

with the individual and social versions of our Vital Survey.

THE SURVEY OF EVILS.

IN his vital survey of contemporary civilisation, the sociologist is impressed by achievements, in which his preliminary surveys, regional and historic, discern rustic roots and civic survivals or renewals. But even more impressive are the defects and the failures conspicuous in contemporary civilisation. To complete the three previous Surveys a fourth is needed. But how to proceed in a systematic survey of evils ? Manifestly by a set of observations suggested, arranged and interpreted by our fundamental formula of the life-process as it works, or fails to work, in society and in the individual. Individuals without definite " place," or misplaced (*i.e.*, in the wrong place), are observable on all sides, from tramp or vagabond to the crowd of " idle rich " who float aimlessly from one international hotel to another. So, too, in the case of " work " and " folk," one may be without work (from unemployed dock labourer to wealthy *flâneur*), or wrongly worked, *i.e.*, mis-worked (with resulting tendency to become " unemployable "). And one may be folkless like the outcast and the derelict, or mis-folked (*i.e.*, in association with the wrong folk) like many " poor-law children " or the *jeunesse dorée* of the night clubs. Turn from the static side of the objective life to its subjective aspect, and we observe the errors and incompetence, ignorance, follies and egoisms of people ; (a) deficient in Sense (and therefore inclined to non-sense and mis-observation) ; (b) without adequate Experience (and so rendered responsive to folly and mischief) ; (c) defective in feeling (and therefore self-centred even to insanity). Consider next the dynamic side of life, first subjective and then objective. Those with no-imagery or mis-imagery are the dull, the idle-dreamers and the

fantasists. From no-ideation or mis-ideation arise the "false values" of distorted philosophies recondite and popular. Finally, lack of emotion, or mis-emotion, generates the venal sins of apathy, pride, anger, indifference, lust, &c. So in the sphere which normally should be that of life triumphantly reshaping the world, there are to be observed; (a) those of "no-achievement" or mis-achievement (the failed and the cowards); (b) people of "no-synergy" or "mis-synergy" (and hence on the way to become criminals); and (c) those of "no-polity" or of "mis-polity" (tending consequently to be traitors).

FROM an examination even so cursory as the above, the sociologist's conception of evil and its working definition should be apparent. Evil is defect or perversion of life; and in no vague and general sense, but in meaning strictly co-ordinate with that four-fold analysis of the social-process which sees it as congruous with the life-process and the mental process. Thus for the survey of evils we have the formula

Poverty and disease	Indolence and Crime
Ignorance, folly and insanity	Apathy and Vice

which in each of its four quarters reveals defects or perversions of the life observable at its normal in the Vital Survey as

Acts	Deeds	for the Individual
Facts	Dreams	

and as

Town	City	for the Community.
School	Cloister	

SOCIAL SERVICE.

CONSIDER next the relation of sociological observation and theory to the corresponding action. Like science in general sociology arises primarily from action, and, even to complete its logical circuit of thought, must return to verify and test its theoretic conclusions in practicable applications. Sociological survey therefore is ultimately for social service. In proceeding from the Regional Survey (geographic, economic and anthropologic) through the Historic Survey and the Vital Surveys to that of Evils, the sociologist follows the customary scientific order from simple to complex. But in action this logical or scientific order has to be reversed; for if we would develop normal life, individual and social to the full, we must (as the great religions all teach and experience confirms) begin by trying to purge it of evil, otherwise the organising of conditions for the "good" life will be frustrated.

EACH of the four surveys, if made not only for science, but also for practice, is followed by its Report, Plan of Action, or scheme of Social Service. Beginning, then, with the Report, Plan of Action, or Scheme

of Social Service, arising from his survey of evils, the applied sociologist must relate himself and his projects to those of traditional and current modes. How, for instance, does he stand with respect to : (a) the Judiciary and Police with their prisons and reformatories ; (b) the old-fashioned philanthropist and his charities and friendly correctionals, or the newer psycho-therapist searching for the roots of vice and disorder in the deeper layers of the mind ; (c) the alienist with his asylums, and the pedagogue with his educational curricula ; (d) the medical practitioner with his specific remedies, and the economist and politician with their Labour Exchanges and the like palliatives for unemployment.

It should be clear that the d, c, b, a, of the above illustration all fit into their respective quarters of the sociologist's formula of defective or perverted life. But what stands out conspicuously in the sociologist's view is the unity and interaction of all the four quarters. It follows that no treatment of evils can be effective, which does not run in definite correlation with the means of life's fulfilment in each and every one of its essential aspects. For comprehensive diagnosis and corresponding treatment all the four surveys along with their Respective Plans of Action are thus essential, and, moreover, they must be worked as integral parts of a life-theory and a life-practice, social and individual, psychic and organic, which operates in verifiable relation with the sciences of man's organic nature, his heredity and physical environment.

HERE, then, is an ambitious aim of pure and applied sociology, involving many conditions as yet far from fulfilled. This lately emergent master-science itself advances with many a halt and decline. It is not easy to foresee the time when it will be in a position to meet all legitimate claims. For the needed concert of thought and campaigns of activity there is required a sociological re-education alike of the body of the people and of specialised groups. These include not only those engaged in "Social Services" definitely so called, but also priests and moralists, politicians and journalists, men of business and economists, physicians and teachers, even artists, poets and romancists.

OF the conditions necessary for progress in sociology, some at least can be defined with clearness and assurance. Pure, or theoretic, sociology needs a working conception of the social process in direct filiation with biology, capable of incorporating the products of psychological and other relevant specialised research, and at the same time well adapted to systematic open-air studies. Applied, or practical, sociology, can only grow effective as it affords a plan of co-operation whereby everyone concerned in maintenance of the social fabric, betterment of environment, sustenance and development of life individual and social, may contribute his or her own day's work undertaken for livelihood or for interest.

V. BRANFORD.

THE GREAT CITY.

I.

SIR WILLIAM PETTY'S VIEWS ON LONDON.¹

THAT the discussion concerning the sociological and economic advantages of city and country is an old one, is well illustrated by one of the essays of that curious and ingenious 17th century writer, Sir William Petty. This essay, entitled *ANOTHER ESSAY IN POLITICAL ARITHMETICK*, published at London, in 1682, attempts to analyse the various benefits which might accrue to society from urban concentration. Pepys wrote in his diary that he considered Petty "the most rational man that ever he heard speak with a tongue."² If this characterisation is at all justifiable (and most students of Petty would be almost persuaded to concur in this extravagance) it may be worth while to examine this "rational" man's views on the comparative advantages of city and country.

PETTY estimated that by 1682 the city of London would have a population of about 670,000 people, and that this number would be doubled in about four years. As an exponent of "political arithmetick,"³ he maintained that the growth of a city could be measured by several significant items: the number of acres which the city encompassed, the number of houses, the "cubical content of the said Housing,"⁴ the "Flooring of the Same," the cost in days, labour or money of these buildings, the value of the houses "according to their Yearly Rent, or Number of Years Purchase," and finally, by the number of the inhabitants.⁵

TURNING to the matter of population, he computed the population increase from Graunt's *BILLS OF MORTALITY*.⁶ This early attempt in the field of vital statistics Petty said was a "new Light to the world"⁷

¹This note was prepared while the writer was making a study of British Mercantilism as a Fellow of the Social Science Research Foundation.

²Pepys, Samuel, *DIARY*.

³Petty's own definition of "Political Arithmetick" is the best: "Instead of using only comparative and superlative words, and intellectual Arguments, I have taken the course (as a specimen of the Political Arithmetick I have long aimed at) to express myself in terms of *Number, Weight, or Measure*; to use only arguments of Sense, and to consider only such Causes, as have visible Foundations in Nature; leaving those that depend upon the mutable Minds, Opinions, Appetites, and Passions of particular Men, to the Consideration of others." Petty, Sir William, *POLITICAL ARITHMETICK*, London, 1690; Reprinted, *THE ECONOMIC WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM PETTY*, Edited by C. H. Hull, Cambridge, 1890, Volume I., p. 244.

⁴Petty, Sir William, *ANOTHER ESSAY IN POLITICAL ARITHMETICK, CONCERNING THE GROWTH OF THE CITY OF LONDON*; 1682. London. Reprinted in Hull's Edition of Petty's Works, Vol. II., p. 457.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 458.

⁶Graunt, Capt. John. *NATURAL AND POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS MENTIONED IN A FOLLOWING INDEX AND MADE UPON THE BILLS OF MORTALITY*. London. 1662.

⁷Petty, Sir William. *OBSERVATIONS UPON THE DUBLIN BILLS OF MORTALITY*. London. 1683. p. 1.

and he proceeded to follow Graunt not only by using his figures but by constructing statistical estimates of his own to such an extent that it is difficult to say whether Graunt or Petty gave the real impetus to statistical and quantitative investigation of social problems. From Graunt's estimates and from his own, Petty concluded that the population of London tended to double in about 40 years. But here his statistical conclusions actually frightened him. If the population of London in 1682, were 670,000, then by 1840 the city would reach the astonishing figure of 10,718,880. The cause of his fright was not, however, the absolute number. His computation of the population increase of the whole country led him to believe that England and Wales would double in population in about 360 years. Estimating the combined population of the two countries at 7,369,000 in 1682, the curious statistical dilemma that resulted was that whereas, in 1840, the population of London would have mounted to 10,718,880, that of England and Wales would be but 10,917,389.⁸ Petty proceeded thereupon to abandon his figures by concluding that these figures themselves proved that "it is Certain and Necessary that the *Growth* of the City must stop before the said Year 1840."⁹ Consequently, the City of London, Petty believed, would reach its greatest population relative to rural population¹⁰ sometime around the year 1800. It was this awkward statistical result that diverted Petty's active mind to a consideration of the social and economic advantages of urban concentration.

WHILE Petty could discover political reasons which would explain the movement of population toward London during the period from 1642 to 1650, he was nonplussed as to what reasons could be assigned to explain a corresponding trend from 1604 to 1642. Rather than to explain the migration by "some Remarkable Accident," which he felt would be as scientific as to explain an illness by the food which the patient had last eaten,¹¹ Petty chose to explain the social phenomenon by "some Natural and Spontaneous Benefits and Advantages that men find by living in great more than in small *Societies*."¹² He proposed to "seek for the *Antecedent Causes* of the *Growth*, in the *Consequences* of the like."¹³

PETTY's method of attacking the problem is engaging. "Whereas in Arithmetick, out of two false *Positions* the Truth is extracted, so I hope out of two *extravagant* contrary Suppositions, to draw forth

⁸Petty. ANOTHER ESSAY. pp. 460-464.

⁹Ibid., p. 464.

¹⁰Petty said "will be at its utmost height in the next preceeding Period, Anno, 1800," but his subsequent discussion shows that he probably meant highest relative population.

¹¹Petty was a student of medicine and natural science, and his works are replete with illustrations drawn from these disciplines.

¹²ANOTHER ESSAY, p. 469.

¹³Ibid.

some solid and consistent *Conclusions*." ¹⁴ He therefore makes two curious assumptions. Taking London's population as 670,000 people, for the first case he magnifies it sevenfold (4,690,000), while supposing that the remainder of the people in England and Wales were to be but 2,710,000. In his second case he diminishes London's population to one-seventh of the 1682 figure (which would give a hypothetical population of 96,000), while supposing that the population of the remainder of the two countries is 7,304,000. His figures, therefore, are :

	1st Assumption.	2nd Assumption.
London	4,690,000	96,000
Remainder of England and Wales	2,710,000	7,304,000

Having constructed his two "false Positions" let us see what "truth is extracted."

THE question which Petty attempts to answer is "In which of these two imaginary states, would be the most convenient, commodious and comfortable Livings?" ¹⁵ But before attacking the whole problem, Petty resolves his general question into twelve particular ones. The first three particular questions are the least important: which of the two assumed schemes of population distribution would provide (1) better defence for the kingdom against invasion (2) better chance of domestic peace (3) greater likelihood of religious uniformity? In all three cases Petty decides in favour of the populous London of the first assumption. A city so large could, with small *per capita* cost, surround the city with an impregnable wall and ditch. No foreign prince, Petty thought, could defeat England's sea power, her land forces, and capture her capital city. As for the maintenance of domestic peace, the "4 Millions 690 Thousand People United within this great City, could easily Govern half the said Number scattered without it." ¹⁶ And as for religious uniformity, Petty's huge city would have "7 times 130 Chappels, in which might not only be an Uniformity of Common Prayer, but in Preaching also." ¹⁷ Indeed, Petty even could conceive how "a thousand copies of one Judiciously and Authentically Composed *Sermon* might be every week read in each of said Chappels." (Here Petty's enthusiasm outstripped his arithmetic and his generosity would provide ninety extra copies.)

THE fourth question concerned itself with the administration of justice. No doubt the great metropolitan centre would attract not only traders but also land and property owners. If that should occur,

¹⁴ANOTHER ESSAY, p. 470.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 470.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 472.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 472.

then the city would provide "*Courts, Offices, Records, Juries and Witnesses*"¹⁸ and as a consequence, "*Justice* may be done with speed and ease."

WHAT about taxation? Would the populous city tend to make taxation more or less burdensome? Equal or unequal? A concentrated urban population would provide the best conditions for the collections of taxes by excise, since it would be organised as a money economy and since all marketing agencies could be controlled. Each member of a state ought to contribute to the government in proportion to the "share and interest they have in the Publick Peace."¹⁹ Moreover, a system of public contribution which taxed expenditure rather than income was what Petty cherished. His conclusions with regard to taxation were, therefore, that urban concentration would make taxation more equitable by an extension of excise duties; would make it less burdensome, since each person could choose by means of his purchases how much excise he would pay; and lastly, the extension of excise taxes would reduce the costs of collecting public income.²⁰

THE fifth question: whether the populous city plan would facilitate foreign trade was also answered in the affirmative. The chief advantage would be the stimulation of manufacturing. "For in so vast a City *Manufactures* will beget one another, and each *manufacture* will be divided into as many parts as possible, whereby the work of each Artisan will be simple and easie."²¹ This phenomenon he illustrated by watch-making, where "If one Man shall make the *Wheels*, another the *Spring*, another shall Engrave the *Dial-plate*, and another shall make the *Cases*, then the *Watch* will be better and cheaper, than if the whole work be put upon any one Man." But in addition to this all-important principle of the division of labour which Adam Smith was later to make famous, Petty saw other commercial advantages of the large city. All the artisans of one trade could be near to each other; merchant ships could be loaded without the preparatory labour of accumulating their cargoes. Costs of transportation would be reduced making the nation a more efficient competitor in foreign markets. Contrariwise, imported goods would be, for the most part, consumed in the metropolitan port of entry, and there would be less inland transportation to create a "surcharge" upon such commodities.

As for the "Arts of Delight and Ornament," wrote Petty, "they are best promoted by the greatest Number of Emulators." In the great city, emulation would be stimulated completely out of comparison with what it might among scattered people. And, more than

¹⁸ANOTHER ESSAY, p. 473.

¹⁹Petty. A TREATISE OF TAXES AND CONTRIBUTIONS. London. 1662. Hull's Edition of Petty's Works, Vol. I., p. 91.

²⁰ANOTHER ESSAY, p. 473.

²¹Ibid.

that, "it is more likely that one *Ingenious Curious Man* may rather be found out amongst 4 Millions than 400 Persons."²²

AN eighth advantage of the large urban population would be the reduction of transportation and travelling. As for the number of beggars and thieves, which was Petty's ninth question, he could see little difference between the two forms of population distribution. Impotents he estimated would be about one in 600 in either case. But about the tenth question, there was no doubt in Petty's mind. The great city organisation of society would lead to the "*Propogation and Improvement of Useful Learning*." In this respect the advantage of urbanisation would be as clear as it would be with regard to manufacturing. "For in the great vast City, there can be no so odd a Conceit or Design, whereunto some Assistance may not be found, which in thin scattered Habitation may not be."²³

As to the "*Increase of People by Generation*," Petty could see no great difference between his two hypothetical states. His twelfth and final question was the only one which received a negative answer. The larger city would not prevent the "mischiefs of *Plagues* and *Contagions*." He agreed rather with his predecessor Graunt who had said that "although seasoned Bodies may, and do live near as long in *London*, as elsewhere, yet new-comers and children do not: for the *Smoaks*, *Stinks*, and close *Air*, are less healthful than that of the Country."²⁴

PETTY's "Essay" is a delightful sample of the sociology of the 17th century. It is remarkable more in method than in universal wisdom. But the studious approach to social problems, the groping for statistical and quantitative guidance in attacking social problems and the deliberative judgment displayed, foreshadowed the modern methods of social research.

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II.

A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF WESTMINSTER.²⁵

PERHAPS the most conspicuous feature of our age is the magnitude and number of towns and cities. They have grown in modern times with a rapidity previously unknown in the world's history. And the immediate cause is manifest. It is that release and manipulation of

²²ANOTHER ESSAY, p. 474.

²³Ibid., p. 475.

²⁴Graunt. OBSERVATIONS ON BILLS OF MORTALITY, p. 373.

²⁵Written to accompany the Civic Survey of Westminster, but hitherto unpublished.

physical energies, which we call the Industrial Revolution. Its Factory phase generated one crop of towns: and the Railway phase another, simultaneously accelerating the growth of the first crop. Machine Production and Mechanical Transport, the parents of many new towns and cities, have of course also multiplied the population and transformed the character of most old towns and cities.

SUCH is the customary view of urban expansion in the modern world. But further analysis discloses other factors, and, moreover, one of particular significance. It has reference to the metropolitan city of each Great State. Every capital of Western Europe, from Vienna to London, from Leningrad to Madrid, presents a history of recent growth, like and yet unlike, that of the industrial and transport cities. There is a differential factor in the adaptation of each capital city to a long-continued succession of wars. The suggestion is this: that the centralization required for the waging of war has been a factor, perhaps the main factor, in metropolitan expansion and prestige, and increasingly during the past four centuries. And not only the magnitude, but also the mentality of metropolitan populations, is correlated with war become habitual. Berlin offers the most conspicuous illustration of both tendencies. An insignificant town of less than 20,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the 17th century, Berlin grew to a city of over three million people by 1914. And the contention is that this hypertrophy was in the main due to the successive centralizations necessitated by war; and that the magnitude and dominance of Berlin were maintained and extended by one successful war after another. How its warlike mentality infected the old burgher cities of Germany is now well known; though the disease had long been incubating.

THE mode of metropolitan growth, exhibited by Berlin so diagrammatically, is shown more obscurely by the other "great capitals" of European States. Their history is of course modified in each case by complicating circumstances. London, for instance, the titular metropolis of the British Empire, is itself dominated by Westminster, the real capital. Mediæval Westminster was little more than a royal and abbatial suburb of London. Then, largely through the centralization brought about by war, fear of war, hope of war, preparation for war, and sequel of war, Westminster ascended the ladder of political power and social prestige. It gained at the expense of old regional capitals like Winchester and Gloucester, where Kings once held court respectively at Easter and Christmas, as in Westminster at Whitsuntide. Later, the long tale of eighteenth-century wars changed Westminster from a national to an imperial capital, with world-wide dominions in tribute. Building beside the nucleus of sanctity in the historic city, Whitehall becomes the political centre of this new-won empire, and

the "West-end" (Mayfair and Belgravia) its social centre: together they acquire for Westminster a position of ever-mounting dominance. The port of London becomes its Piræus: East-London its factory and warehouse quarter; the "city" of London its banking adjunct and staple-market; the other metropolitan boroughs subordinate themselves to its service; "provincial" citizens do it homage by pilgrimage, by seasonal migration, and by absorbing its "news." And finally its prestige is crowned by the loyalties of far-flung dominions. An ebb and flow of colonial emotion is generated by that mystical "legend of London" whose reality is the cult of Westminster-London.

IN so far as this analysis holds—as it would be easy to extend it to Paris and to Vienna, to Moscow and Leningrad, and even to Washington—each imperial metropolis is to be accounted a war-city, whose maintenance and survival depend on an orientation of the national culture to a veiled state of war. Impulses to this end, some of them perhaps half-conscious, others quite unwitting, can be discerned in the characteristic life and doings of industrial as well as metropolitan cities. A certain solidarity of great towns and cities is thus brought into confrontation with the pacific interests of civilization, such as those of Home and Garden, Farm, Fold and Workshop. So deep a cleavage no doubt betokens the presence of some highly transformative ferment at the heart of modern society. A growing mass of evidence bears testimony to this view, and also begins to make clear the nature of the transmutation. Consider then, in light of this testimony, the general aspects of the prevalent disharmony between Home and City, between Town and Country.

SEQUEL and issue to some three centuries of lesser wars, the Great War manifestly indicates a culminating crisis in the long-drawn fever of Transition, from which our Western world has suffered, and still suffers. The disease may be interpreted as symptom of a confused struggle to escape the pains of a dying civilization, and to enter upon a richer inheritance, glimpsed but not grasped. The finer and larger vision of life which dawned with the Classical Revival, set men's hearts ablaze with a passion of realisation. Then arose a conception of personality; as, at its full, blending the newly recovered Greek ideals of bodily perfection and mental opulence, with the mediæval heritage of Christian virtues and graces. The Gentleman-Scholar of the Renaissance did, at his best (as for instance in types like Sir Philip Sidney), embody this Classico-Christian ideal of personality. At the peak of its curve, the Renaissance type touched that level of attainment. And the aspiration to be Gentleman and Scholar in one, for a brief and glorious generation, engaged the patrician mind throughout Western Europe. Indeed, despite much decadence, its surviving vestiges may still be found.

THE Reformation and the Revolution, both aiming at other ends, nevertheless carried this ideal of personality—and of course too, its womanly counterpart, the cultivated Lady, into widening circles, till it wellnigh embraced the community. It penetrated to the middle classes in the seventeenth century, and to the working classes in the nineteenth. But communal desire for liberation of personality, into full play of life, implied immense changes in social organisation. The needed readjustments of Church and State, of learning, education, labour, industry, commerce, finance, all needed to be worked out, by arduous process of trial and error. To adapt traditional systems of temporal and spiritual power to the new needs was, and is, the social issue. The problem has been confused, and the task hindered, by exacerbation of old hostilities and the acrimony of new. Sectarianism in Church joined with partisanship in State to set Class against Class, and Nation against Nation. Rivalries of Capital and Labour, emulations of Specialized Interests, discords of the Sciences and the Humanities, have thrown into shadow every tradition of unity, and correspondingly delayed endeavours of renewal.

ALL these feuds, negligences, confusions, concentrate in the modern city, and make it, at best a focus of unrest, at worst a hot-bed of corruption. In the great capitals more especially, does the intensity of struggle for individual survival, and for group or class dominance, compound with rivalries, intercivic and international; and thus to generate, in metropolitan populations, two characteristic habits of mind. One is a chronic habituation to a mood of fear, mitigated, yet in the long run intensified, by periodic rebound into extravagance of hope; and the other, an impulse to exploit every situation of peril, real or imaginary. Both tendencies react to sharpen the edge of competitive traffic at home, and warlike rivalries abroad. Doctrines which interpret life in terms of strife abound and flourish. They grow and multiply in our urban milieu like weeds in an unkempt garden. Under a disguise of detachment and generality they infect our thinking, and even our emotions, with a competitive bias. Under their sway, metropolitan interests masquerade as national aspirations; and the myth of an Absolute and Omnipotent State gains credence.

WITH this sanction of power and exaltation of strife, a corresponding enfeeblement overtakes the traditions and movements that build on life's sweet and gentle harmonies. Inevitably there sets in that atomizing of urban populations, which runs to its limit in each great capital. There all the natural impulses of unredeemed egoism find their nidus. There the surviving fragments of outworn temporal and spiritual powers congregate as in a sanctuary of illusion; and quickening with renewed vigour, they kindle the embers of dead feuds and dying superstitions.

WHAT our cities are, our minds tend to be: and, broadly speaking, the more educated we are, the more our minds tend to catch, absorb and reflect that working synthesis of our age and civilization, which the metropolitan city is. Each great capital furnishes its nation, for better or worse, with an outfit of adjusted temporal and spiritual powers. It provides the instruments of Sovereignty and the criteria of Influence. The writ of its Executive runs within effective range of the metropolitan press, and the moral efficacy of that press is reinforced by a host of varied ancillaries. A ceaseless outflow of books, periodicals, journals, expounds the metropolitan mind; a stream of unending novelties, recreational and artistic, displays the charm of metropolitan features; spates of oratory and propagandism flood the platforms of the country with metropolitan notions of what is worth while. If then, as assumed, the life of every modern metropolis is fragmented to the limit of cohesion under a binding impulse of fear, and desire to exploit it, far-reaching must be the effects on national character. All the natural impulses and social aspirations which promote integrity of life, and therefore foster the growth of personality and its ennoblement, will be discouraged. All the natural difficulties and historic survivals, which obstruct the genesis of personality and its ennoblement, will be encouraged. And religions which cultivate holiness of personality as the fine flower of communion with life's ideals will work under grave disabilities.

REFLECT upon the social consequences. Those who inherit the traditions and own the means of culture will hold fast to their possessions with grimmest determination. Those who lack both means and tradition will struggle for them with fiercest resolve; or lapse into an acceptance, paralyzing or degrading, of such compensations and substitutes as can be had. In the resulting *mélée* of chronic strife between individuals, groups, classes, nations, all more or less at cross purposes, the waste of life and energies has been prodigious. Yet, mistaking this urban process of individual struggle and group competition for a phenomenon of nature, the nineteenth century theorists of the emulative life enunciated their doctrine of development by Natural Selection at the margin of strife. But to-day, it is safe to say, no informed and critical school holds that along this way run the central path of natural development, and the main track of human progress. On the contrary, a growing consensus of scientists and philosophers, relatively liberated from the mechanical and urban ideas of Victorian times, stresses the co-operative factor. The higher the type of life, the more actively and purposively, it would seem, does the species share in directing its own evolution. The essence of natural progress appears to reside in an integral activity of the species. If it would survive and develop, the species must play its part in solidarity. It must act as a united firm embarked on high commerce. The purpose of the partnership is masterfully yet rhythmically to

interplay with environment in such wise as to draw out, and develop to their utmost, the qualities of life latent in, and characteristic of, that species.

ACCEPT this reading of organic evolution, and you see more clearly how and why nature impels Man ceaselessly to seek his heart's desire. Our cities are the master instruments contrived by the human race for achieving its purpose ; they play the crucial part in shaping the course of civilization. It follows that our cities aid, or hinder, human fulfilment, according as they stage a concert of personalities, or a combat of factions. And the supreme type of personality, attainable at any given time by the people of a particular civilization, must be taken as given in its history, and explicable therefrom. For our western civilization it is presumably set forth in that vision of life, which integrates into one undivided personality, the Christian graces and the Classic powers and dignities. To discover the correlative design of environment, and the equivalent ordering of tradition, is, or should be, the goal of synthesis ; and to realize the triad of personality, environment and tradition, as city and region, is, or should become, the objective of synergy.

THE city and its countryside do, in point of fact, and in any case, exhibit the pattern which each regional group of mankind is weaving on the loom of time. And by mode of interplay with its rural and urban milieu, the regional group records its rank in the scale of cultural development. Human progress, as the evolutionist sees it, is in substituting, for crude process of empiric trial and error, a well-designed plan of interaction between People and Place, through the intermediacy of Work and Vocation. And for us Westerners, plans are to be reckoned as well-designed when adjusted to the fashioning and the flourishing of Classico-Christian personalities. To this end we have to conceive, and execute, plans of rural development and designs of civic attainment. Our Agriculture, Industry, Politics ; our Education, Arts, Sciences, Morals should indicate the outline, and furnish the details, of such plans and designs. To hallow and illumine their unison is the office of Religion. Unless these human conditions of environmental mastery be fulfilled, the ideals of life remain abstractions remote from reality. For all but a fortunate few, the Classico-Christian aspiration is no better than vain and derisive counterfeit. The Renaissance went wrong in limiting that ideal to patrician orders : the Reformation went wrong in seeking to realize it by vague indirection of Religion and Education : the Industrial Revolution and the Democratic Revolution have gone wrong in assuming it to be the ripe fruit of political power and economic privilege.

DEEPER insight into nature than the mechanical evolutionism of the nineteenth century reached, and clearer vision of history than nineteenth century documentation afforded, begin to indicate a way out

of the modern transition, by renewal of Regional Cultures in their integrity. As we move along this way of evolutionary purpose and human aspiration, assuredly should cease that urban hypertrophy which promotes, in the populations of both town and country, a chronic splitting and fracture of personality. Then reasonably will be mitigated, if not dispelled, our present nightmare of personal Repressions, Reversions, Perversions, which the psycho-analysts, pursuant to theological precedent, and unmindful of life's integrity, blame upon "human nature."

VICTOR BRANFORD.

IS GREGARIOUSNESS AN INSTINCT? by K. C. Mukerji.

PROFESSOR MCDUGALL has pointed out "We can hardly doubt that the human species is endowed with the gregarious instinct."¹ He regards it as one of the major instincts of human life and holds definitely that "the gregarious instinct is the cement without which the group could not come into existence or grow beyond the very simple form of the family."² But Boris Sidis is of opinion that "suggestibility is the cement of the herd, the very soul of the primitive social group Man is a social animal, no doubt, but he is social because he is suggestible."³ All may not agree with Sidis in his view that suggestibility operates only through the mechanism of the subconscious, but none perhaps denies the influence which suggestibility of human nature bears upon its gregarious habit. Even Mr. W. Trotter remarks that "judged from our present standpoint the valuable feature of Sidis's book is that it calls attention to the undoubtedly intimate relation between gregariousness and suggestibility."⁴

THE popularity of the herd instinct has, no doubt, been greatly increased by the publication of Mr. Trotter's book,⁵ but even Mr. Trotter has not treated much of its specific nature or referred to what Professor McDougall calls the lock and key arrangement of the instinct. Instead of defining the instinct properly he has dealt particularly with its bearing on the psychology of man. But still he points out that "the cardinal mental characteristic of the gregarious animal is his sensitiveness to his fellow-members of the herd."⁶ Now we may analyse this sensitiveness and find out its characteristic features in order to see how far it may be recognised as a distinct instinct. There are primarily three different forms of innate sensitiveness such as "the sensitiveness to other persons' feelings, which we call sympathy, the sensitiveness to other persons' opinions, which we call suggestibility and the readiness to follow other persons' courses of action, which we call imitation."⁷ So man is by nature sympathetic, suggestible and imitative. It is these innate qualities which make man gregarious. Thus the innate qualities such as suggestion, sympathy and imitation are the three constituent elements of man's gregariousness which is expressed not only in the feeling of uneasiness in isolation but also in the mental urge to act unitedly in the group. The feeling of uneasiness in isolation may be taken as its negative character and is particularly

¹McDougall. *OUTLINE OF PSYCHOLOGY*, p. 153.

²Ibid., p. 156.

³Boris Sidis. *PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION*, p. 310.

⁴W. Trotter. *INSTINCTS OF THE HERD IN PEACE AND WAR*, p. 27.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 142.

⁷Thouless. *SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*, pp. 155-156.

observed in the behaviour of the Damara Calf, of the person in the solitary cell and sometimes even of the cynic who desires the presence of other persons to speak to them about his cynicism and so does not like isolation altogether. Its positive aspect is expressed when the gregarious animals work together for a common purpose. This common action becomes especially definite and largely imitative when the group has a definite leader. Viewed from the side of feeling this process appears as a sympathy, active and passive. Active sympathy is something more than the passive ; the former implies that there is the desire of the agent to observe that others should share his feelings and thus involves some degree of reciprocation while the latter may be wholly one-sided and consists in the experiencing of any feeling when the expression of that feeling is observed in other persons. This native disposition mainly enables us to keep in touch with others, and is of prime importance for the development of the sentiment of affection towards one another. We are naturally sensitive to the feelings of others, and also actively desire that others should be sensitive to ours. This sympathetic induction of our mutual emotions and the accompanying desire for it are the cements which bind us together and render the actions of all the members of our society harmonious. Sympathy is thus the most sure foundation of love and is an essential feature of any completely satisfying affection. So it is for the operation of this native sympathy that we find the whole group swayed by the same emotions when one of its members is afflicted. It seems that all the members of a group are pervasively bound up by a common chord of feeling, though they may not, so long as they remain together, be conscious of the force of this common feeling, but they become bitterly aware of it when they are individually severed from the rest. For, then, the mental energy which found so long an easy outlet in their characteristic behaviours with the companions gets obstructed ; it then acts upon the mind itself and affects their whole mental constitution—thus causing them to be restless. This restlessness which follows as a reaction, may get further strengthened by the simultaneous operation of some other instincts, such as the instincts of fear, anger, &c. The mental agony of Galton's Ox of Damaraland caused by the severance from his herd is due to such reactionary upsetting of his mental make-up which may be further increased by the simultaneous operation of other instinctive impulses such as anger, fear, &c. This thwarted energy requires proper control and sublimation, otherwise it may, in the long run, result in disastrous effects such as happen in the case of prison psychosis in the solitary cell.

So far we find the importance of the affective elements in gregariousness. The third aspect from which it is possible to view the group life is the cognitive. Its essential feature consists in suggestion whereby one mind acts upon the others more or less unconsciously so that they

may intuitively share similar ideas and tend to act in complete harmony towards some common end. This is no doubt a restricted use of suggestion; for what is suggested may be an idea, a feeling, or the impulse to a course of action. The communication of feelings as sympathy and of courses of action as imitation has already been discussed. So we should restrict the word suggestion to the communication of thought. The innate dispositions such as sympathy, imitation and suggestion are generally apt to work in conjunction with the other innate dispositions which are purely instinctive and thus cannot be regarded as distinctively independent. Except on the rational level, in which everything is done through deliberation, the operation of these dispositions implies the operation of some really instinctive tendencies in the mind: the former may be regarded as manifestations of the latter. Feeling, active impulse, or an idea may be readily communicated to and find an easy response in another animal when it appeals to some instinct directly. So fear, curiosity and anger are communicated readily in the animals of the same species or groups. We observe that the behaviour of one animal, upon the excitement of an instinct, immediately evokes similar behaviour in those of his fellows who perceive his expressions of excitement. So when the characteristic cry of fear is emitted by one member of a flock, we often find that all of its fellows within reach of the sound are excited by fear and take to flight like one individual. The responses of primitive sympathy which we find almost simultaneously occurring among the members of a herd may be primarily due to the imitative disposition, and later become secondary to the sympathetic induction of the emotions and feelings they express.

SUGGESTION, in order to be properly effected and to bring the potency of belief or of action, has somehow to operate upon a tendency of the mind and thus to be linked on to some interest. So it may effect countersuggestion in action if it rouses interest other than the one suggested. Children often playfully act contrary to suggestion, but in the case of adults the reason is personal. The special sensitivity of children to suggestion is due perhaps to their want of sufficient knowledge which helps the instinct of self-submission operating in the mind. This instinct works also in the mind of the excited mob which readily executes the suggestion of the leader and becomes intolerant of any hindrance to it.

THESE dispositions such as sympathy, imitation and suggestion act most in their native form when they are spontaneous and wholly free from voluntary forcing. They are more real and more effective the more spontaneously they come into being. When they are voluntarily determined through the processes of deliberation and attention, they pass the stage of instinctive level and become ideational. So

individual peculiarities in the function are possible in human beings. But crowds which temporarily lack the power of self-possession display almost in their native form the force of the three dispositions—sympathy, suggestibility and imitation on a great scale—which really become the principal sources of the wild excesses of which crowds are so often guilty. Thus by the gregariousness of an animal we recognise that he is sympathetic, suggestible and imitative, and that these qualities are innate. The innateness of these social reactions is what we mean by affirming the existence of a gregarious instinct.

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HEALTH AND WEALTH OF THE FOLK TO FURTHER THE REGIONAL IDEA: by A. H. Mackmurdo.

TOWARD an illuminating interpretation of the statement made by Mr. Griffith in his excellent paper "A New Analysis of Unemployment" which appeared in your April issue, some further notes may be of use bringing to the surface facts lying below the reach of general observation. They are facts that to-day are pushing up into the common consciousness and to their influence must be attributed changes in the attitude of the man (*a*) to his *Group*; (*b*) to the *Wealth* which his group periodically renews; (*c*) to the *Region* wherein his group lives. Moreover, they are facts which underlie the whole structure of modern communities, and owing to their permanence and universality, are like to effect a radical change in their economic policy, national and international—a change at first largely increasing unemployment, afterwards absorbing every available worker.

TAKING these changes of attitude in their order we may briefly summarise them thus.

Man's personal attitude to the group of which he is a conscious member.

THE modern system by which man's everyday needs are supplied—team work with meticulous sub-division and output in mass—is responsible in the economic field for the sense of mutual dependence, first, of the man's welfare upon the group activity from factory and field to state, and secondly, of the group's welfare upon the man's activity from legislator to scavenger. This sense of a reciprocity in interests and a mutuality in responsibilities is leading the common mind to a growing insistence upon an equality of opportunity in the training of the individual for doing what in him lies, with a subsequent opportunity to do his chosen job. This on the part of the individual. Then, on the part of the group this sense of interdependence between the collective welfare and the individual welfare—the one a reflection of the other—is bringing upon the horizon social measures encouraging and helping every member who draws upon the store of the group to an activity socially beneficial, and to a condition socially healthy. The movement toward better provision for technical training after puberty is a response to a sense of the first of these interdependent responsibilities. The measures now being inaugurated by central and local authorities to find employment for the surplus labour of private enterprise with improved housing and medical facilities are a response to this new sense of duty on the part of the group towards its members.

A LIKE movement within the factory is forcing to the front considerations that tally more fully with a consciousness of the mutuality of

interest in the output on the part of operative and management. These movements, however, do but slightly and remotely affect present unemployment, though they will largely affect future employment.

The man's attitude toward the Wealth which his group periodically renews.

HERE we may trace the origin of a change of view on the part of the mass likely to bring about a greater "bouleversement" of the world's economic system with its corresponding social structure than any the world has yet seen.

THE wealth brought into being by the sum of specialised effort within a community is consumed within the year and has to be renewed each agricultural year. This Wealth is the product of the human energy set free for work after the needs of life itself have been met. Here, it is of social importance that we grasp elemental facts not commonly comprehended. First, that the sole economic source of that human energy of which Wealth is the by-product, lies wholly in the vital food we have consumed. Secondly, and consequent upon this first fact, the economic cost of all the Wealth annually produced within a nation cannot exceed by one loaf's cost the economic cost of all the vital foodstuff annually consumed within the nation. This very real relation of food-consumption to wealth production is not generally seen, yet, it is perhaps the most powerful factor in the serious situation now being brought about the world over, and notably in that lack of balance between field and factory which causes much unemployment and produces a wide social cleavage.

WERE we to analyse the mass attitude toward this Common Wealth we should find it centred round this dimly comprehended fact; namely, that inasmuch as a community is now maintained by its several industries and services actuated in specialised compartments, no kind of wealth is or can be produced by the sole effort of the individual. He cannot produce and market a turnip without the aid of many Social resources and the remote Co-operation of many other individuals. The making of a boot calls upon some contributory effort on the part of, say, some fifty other persons. The sense that this is somehow so is permeating the common mind leading to a demand for a more just apportionment of the Wealth periodically created by this Co-operative effort. This demand will in due course eventuate in a change of social structure analogous to that which constituted the type for our country and every other country in days before the working people were taken from the fields and regimented in factories. In these former days so real was the innate sense that a man's work was his contribution to the community-group in return for which his livelihood and person was secure, that every manual

worker, every professional man rendering a service accepted, as a matter of course, a regulation as to his share of this common wealth, a share having no relation to the social value of his work. This wealth apportionment was instrumented by a regulation of pay, or a scale of charges varying with the costly nature of the work. The social basis of this regulation was the relation of supplies to functional needs. Each worker would receive out of the available wealth as much as would enable him to carry on, domestically and vocationally. In most of our professions, and in the skilled industries, the claims of the individual upon the community in respect of work done, is still regulated by the vocational body to which the worker belongs. So much your fee, so much my salary, or wage.

THIS ethical principle of common wealth apportionment, *to each according to his need*, prevailed through every sphere of work contributing to this common stock of wealth from feudal days up to the period of the industrial revolution. Thenceforward, the system of mass production by enormous teams introduced new features for which there was no social provision for a "price regulation." The man who drove the factory team was free to make what charge he could upon the common wealth. He could do more than maintain himself domestically and vocationally. He could accumulate claims upon the labour of the future by his surcharge.

THIS custom of an unrestrained charge upon the public in the private interest, while it brought social benefits, it blurred the social outlook of every worker. The operative no longer looks upon his work as a social service: he has come to regard it as a mere preliminary to drawing a wage. The administrator likewise regards his office as a means of drawing a profit; a profit having no relation to personal needs or social considerations. The man in the factory is thus brought face to face with the operations of two antagonistic forces. One compelling him to accept a wage fixed by that which will keep him at work: the other impelling the administrator to adopt a system of paying his operative and pricing his goods, such as will bring to him the greatest profit which competition will allow. This contrast between a "regulated wage" and an "unregulated profit" has caused men to think furiously.

WITH the tradition of the past behind him, when a restraint was imposed upon human cupidity, the operative becomes restive under a curb controlled by a fellow citizen who is unwilling to submit to any such curb over his own cupidity. Pending the introduction of some regulation of functional pay by the Industry as a whole, the State must take back into the stream of national expenditure a large and increasing portion of these excess profits. But, in the presence of this antagonism of interest within the factory, we cannot expect that "co-operation between leaders and the rank and file" referred

to by Mr. Griffith. True is it, as he says, that the policy of price-rings and also the ill-will between the classes, have been factors in an ineffectiveness in the home market. These price-rings are the objective results; the ill-will is the subjective result of the new attitude of the individual worker, be he administrator or operative, to the stock of wealth which the industry of head and hand periodically renews.

FURTHER, this socially irresponsible attitude on the part of the administrative order of working man brings about an increase of unemployment on its own account. Since the making of a profit is the avowed and legalised aim of private enterprise, to make this as large as may be is but natural. To this end the machine will be made increasingly automatic and costs will be reduced by the elimination of human work in every process. Science will be made to play its part in developing mechanical facilities; even the collective conscience through the state will be made to play its part in facilitating the reduction of hands in the factory by the public maintenance of all those thrown out of employ by the profiteer. It is futile our attempting to ignore the anti-social character of this new feature of unrestrained profit: or to pretend that the edge of this instrument of unemployment, as an aid to profit, may be blunted by state action or human feeling. Until each Industry *as an economic unit* is made responsible for its own unemployed there is nothing to arrest the increased number of workers being thrown upon the state by the development of mechanical processes on one hand, and the competition to make a profit on the other hand.

OR, on this head, shall we have to wait until every profit cancels itself out by the profits derived from the over charges of production and distribution being spread over as wide an area as the consumption of distributed products—an area including every adult citizen? For, 'tis certain this general cancellation will come about if and when the proletariat responds to the "Saving" crusade; every working member of the community then levying a tribute upon his neighbour member while also paying this same tribute when purchasing his goods and services. It may be.

We now come to the change overtaking the public mind in regard to the region wherein the group lives—the homeland.

WE see throughout the world a new spirit brooding over these homelands: a spirit of self-determination leading to a regional solidarity; a will to make one's own country, even at some sacrifice, a Mother-country—a country providing her children's essential needs by her own native abilities and out of her own natural stores. Every community is now set, first, upon governing itself, next, upon developing to the utmost its own natural resources and its own native abilities.

To this end door after door is being closed against the entry of foreign goods. This movement in a country that can feed itself will soon absorb all its available labour, while it will at once displace labour hitherto employed by a country exporting goods against imported food. Against this new social tendency impelling communities to supply their own wants and thus bring about a balance between field and factory, the politicians and economists are helpless.

THERE is, moreover, another aspect of international trade which by its growing recognition will strengthen the determination of communities to make each its own region an economic unit,—that is, an economic unit in the sense that, within a geographical area where its own standard of cost and price rules, there shall be no unrestrained competition created by the entry of goods made in other areas and at prices that make such competition disadvantageous to native industries. Here is a sequence of facts which will constitute the dominant factor of all inter-regional trade in the future when the recognition of these facts is forced upon the public mind by the full force of competition for profits.

1. EVERY region has its own climate and soil : the fecundity of nature varying with the geniality of climate and soil.
2. Every region produces a kind of foodstuff which becomes the staple foodstuff of its people.
3. THE labour cost of maintaining life varies with the region.
4. THE cost of all human energy and of its by-products will vary directly with the labour cost of its staple food production.

THE meaning of this sequence of facts is this. The value of all things made or done by human energy is arbitrarily fixed by Nature according to the cost of labour involved in the production of the energising food. Hence the price of a pair of boots made in region A. will for ever differ from the price of a like pair of boots made in region B. Price, then, is a resultant of *climatic* and *biologic* conditions. Every import must therefore cost either more or else less than a similar home product. This fact coupled with the desire to develop native industries is compelling our own offspring to close their doors against us. The physical impossibility of establishing a uniform price in the international market is making it impossible to establish an international market as an economic unit even between two such communities as that of Britain and that of Canada. The free operation of facts outside human control upon a trade whose basis is "competition for profit" will tend to throw an increasing number of workers out of factories working for export.

To the many factors of unemployment pointed out by Mr. Griffith in his analysis we must then add those resulting from these three fundamental changes in the public consciousness : (1) as to the

relation between the individual and his *Folk-group* : (2) as to the relation of the individual worker to the *group-wealth* : (3) as to the relation of the individual to the *region* whence the group-wealth is derived.

THESE factors, when allowed free play, will facilitate a more natural interplay between folk, work and place. And this freer interplay will modify the whole social structure by making it more homogeneous in itself, less parasitic and more readily responsive to external forces making for the betterment of physical conditions. Parasitic features will be largely eliminated, education and world experience more widely diffused, economic disparities reduced. Hence, these world-movements, within and without our own borders, forcing, as they will, a readjustment between folk, work and place where relations have become so inorganic or disorganised, are matters that call for closer study by the sociologist.

IN this matter of unemployment we are brought face to face with the maladjustment between the elemental needs of *man* and the natural potentialities of *place*. The fact is forced upon our attention that the recent unrestrained pursuit of profit for private ends has overthrown the natural balance between field and factory within the region of our own nation. The natural adjustment of home supplies to home demands has been broken up for an artificial adjustment of mass production to personal profit. The resultant economic system which has based the productivity of home work upon needs arising in foreign lands is economically unsound and socially perilous. The stroke of a statesman's pen overseas may in a moment upset this artificial adjustment of folk, work and place ; closing factories and throwing out of employ large numbers of men and women ; *a condition that could not happen in a country that feeds itself*. The wash of such an economic disturbance reaches the home of every family in the land. It involves, at the least, a partial reinstatement of the natural adjustment, a response to the natural relation between regional demands and regional supplies. This readjustment is very costly, complex, and socially disturbing. Moreover, it is a change over that requires considerable time for carrying it out, during which time the State must fill the breach made in our foreign trade by a dole to the unemployed.

IN so far as a nation is not parasitic ; its standard of living will be determined by the following four factors. Its climate, its geographical position, its geologic soil, its native capacity and desire to use its surplus energy to the best advantage in field, workshop and social institutions. The free interplay of these factors, directed by the human will towards an abundant life, brings about a balance in the nation's economy between field and factory ; the kind of balance you get in a tree between its root-growth and branch-growth. Immediately this balance of a nation's economy is altered by supplies from outside taking the place

of home products, an unstable factor is introduced, and one beyond the national control. The foreigner may at any moment refuse to take things made in another country : refuse also to continue making things he does not need for his own use. This leads to an unemployment in each country. This accounts for much unemployment within the last few years in countries that can feed themselves, such as Japan and America. These agricultural countries recently developed a mechanical power to produce factory goods for foreign markets. These goods the foreign markets are now refusing to take. Consequently, factories are being closed down in Japan and America, while a new readjustment between the supply of natural and artificial goods for the home market is being started.

As things are now going in the world, this movement towards a more complete national equipment by home-made things, must bring about a disturbance of employment till the new balance has been found.

THIS balance between field and factory, first, for the adequate supply of foodstuffs to feed a nation during its agricultural year, secondly, for the supply of artificial needs, is a matter of more than economic importance great as this importance is. This balance affects beneficially or otherwise, the whole social structure, as may be seen in our own country so largely parasitic.

If we let our minds play freely upon these facts, giving to each fact its proper weight and place in an economic scheme commensurate with a geographical region such as Britain, will they not indicate a way out of our unemployment trouble ?

FOR instance, a nation that by its root industry can and does feed itself, may grow, spread and carry its own branch-industries upon its own terms. Such branch industries will no longer be the sport of decisions come to in other countries, lopping them off at any moment. Its food bill for the year having been paid by the work of a section of the community, the remainder is then free to work *as it will* for the provision of the clothing, housing, movement and other conveniences : which goods and services, as to a portion, will be sold to the food producers for their products, the balance being exchanged one thing for another among those who produce the goods and render the services till all are absorbed.

A NATION that feeds itself, unless it have committed a section of its workers to produce goods for export, need have no unemployment problem. And we are told by those who should know that given improved conditions of diet, a more effective land cultivation, and an economy of distribution, Britain could feed her present population : the balance of field and factory gradually cancelling out all unemployment as we become independent of other countries for life's necessities. The Shepherd Kings again the Rulers of nations.

A. H. MACKMURDO.

PANORAMA : A FRAGMENT.¹

CHARACTERS.

CICELY HELSTON, *newly married and of somewhat emancipated inclinations.*

ELFRIDA WILKINS, *a convent school-teacher.*

MRS. DUFFIN, *in charge of a grocery-store.*

CICELY and Miss Wilkins were together in the drawingroom. Cicely had before her a volume of very modish verse and another on recent science. Miss Wilkins began to reproach her for her excessive love of novelties. "You wrong me, I think," said Cicely, "I'm far from in love with these novies—I'm interested but puzzled. Everything's becoming so strange, so weird nowadays—the new developments in all the arts and in all the sciences, those of matter and life and mind alike, and all the new mechanisms of civilised life and all the changes, especially the political and social, traceable immediately or quite unmistakably to the war. Think, Frida, of all these things and of their endless reverberations and interactions and then try to forecast and envisage the outcome. Humanity, instead of settling down after the war, is becoming more unsettled than ever. True it is also expectant and venturesome, but, alas, no longer confident, perhaps not even hopeful. The spirit of the last generation was optimistic—*futuri temporis laudator*; that of the present is apprehensive, anxious, not without foreboding. And what is to be the upshot of it all? Well, I do hope at least a kinder world."

"SAY rather," exclaimed Miss Wilkins, "a better, a more religious, a more Godfearing world."

"KINDER, I think," said Cicely, "should mean better and better should mean kinder. But all this novelty bewilders, dazes, staggers even. Today the Angel of Change is abroad on the Earth, kindling beacon and bonfire, seeming here a new light and there an incendiary and who shall stay him?"

"WHAT do you suppose to be the cause of it?" asked Miss Wilkins.

¹The above article is a chapter—the sixth—from an unpublished book in fifteen chapters dealing in the framework of a very simply outlined story and mainly in dialogue form with some of the chief problems of life and reality as these might be regarded by persons of differing temperament and outlook. Some of the chapters seemed to admit of being read apart from the rest and the present chapter by reason of what may perhaps be termed its more synoptic method seemed to be the most representative of the book as a whole. The description *A Fragment* has been added because, though the book is nearly complete, it is possible that no more will ever be published.

The author has read not-much and seen-or-heard not-much, therefore perforce trusts chiefly to a good memory—if that expression be psychologically tolerable—and to the inward light.

"SEVERAL," said Cicely, "several and diverse might be suggested. But the chief, I should think, is extreme specialisation with consequent estrangement of the expert in every sphere from the general public. Progressive differentiation has hitherto characterised civilisation. First perhaps the cultural sphere began to be differentiated from the practical. Then in the former art, the sphere of imagination, began to be differentiated from science, including metaphysics, the sphere of reasoning. That imagination functions also in science and reason in art may be an apparently obvious fact, but, I hold, is in the last analysis untrue, while the general opinion that art is a matter of feeling, science of reason simply won't do at all. Afterwards the various arts and sub-arts, the various sciences and sub-sciences took shape. In the practical world the spheres of imagination and reason were never differentiated; but the movement can be traced there too, though on other lines. And in the transverse aspect of society the same thing is apparent, as in the differentiation of aristocratic and popular culture—folk-culture—and of a ruling and a subject population."

"IN that case," said Miss Wilkins, "all this strangeness and unintelligibility must go on increasing."

"I DON'T think so," said Cicely; "I think that differentiation and specialisation should presently yield to reassimilation and regeneralisation, analysis to synthesis; the great problem in the solution of which progressive civilisation consists must be solved on the same lines as every other complex problem. Of course throughout there are provisional syntheses, otherwise the world couldn't get on. And the critical change to synthesis and reassimilation has begun already. The various arts, the various practical spheres, the various sciences especially, all show signs of a new interdependence. Similarly regarding class-divisions. Thus there is the revived interest in such 'reliques' of popular culture—folk-song, folk-legend and so on—as have survived the uprootings due to the industrial revolution. Again, the aristocratic organisation of industry is questioned and already in a small degree qualified, that of politics has nominally and in part actually gone. Those however who first felt the evils of extreme specialisation misjudged the situation; they looked back rather than forward and they failed to see that the established lines of differentiation needed to be not annulled but transcended. An instance is the Wagnerian opera with its attempted return to an undisintegrated art-unity and folk-unity. Another is the Scottish eighteenth-century lyric, which was primarily a folk-culture revival and sought to rejoin 'music and sweet poetry' on retrograde lines—Burns himself generally required the inspiration of some traditional air. Another instance is democracy, the first champions of which were moved by a belief that all aristocracy is usurpation. They were indeed so far right that

aristocracy as they knew it was to a very great extent bastard aristocracy, caste-rule, dependent perhaps more on birth than on merit. Yet in trying to suppress caste-rule they have in great measure set-aside natural aristocracy too instead of restoring it and progressively qualifying it with popular elements. Quite possibly there was no other course ; now however we see the result in the Fascist and similar upheavals, which are in some measure the answer of nature—human nature—to the attempt to actualise the unreal principle of equal right. Not that I would consider democracy or any reversion or part-reversion towards primitive equalitarianism or other primitive homogeneity to be necessarily wrong. Such things can bring at least temporary advantages and democracy with all its shortcomings may be better than Fascism and be amply justified—as a makeshift, a clumsy artifice for checking the still potent actualities of class-ascendancy. But one can't expect very much of nor can one hope to 'make the world safe for' a makeshift.

"It seems to me that this movement in civilisation is especially interesting in relation to art ; but in order to understand its bearing thereon one must first understand the inter-relations of the arts themselves. In an introduction to a little book of war-verses presented to my husband by the author which I chanced upon the other day I found some remarks that seemed to me to form an excellent supplement to my own ideas on the matter. Let me read them to you and put a stopper on my own unconscionable harangue."

HERE she rose and took down a book from one of the shelves.

"YES," she went on, "the author is an exservice-man and most of these poems were written either in France or in Italy. One or two of them rather took my fancy, the following for instance, which is distinguished from the rest by a certain weirdness, hardly characteristic I think.

* MOONRISE AFTER BATTLE.

' O'er the dark deathfields dawns a ghostlike splendour,
The lone, the weary wanderer of the sky :
Art thou, pale visitant, in nature tender,
Though listless be thine eye ?

' Yet, cold or kind, know here less cause for pining,
Grieved for thy barren years, thou happier than
Our mother Earth, which sees, beneath thy shining,
What man has made of man.'

"How do you like that ?"

"Too fanciful," replied Miss Wilkins.

"I THOUGHT you'd say something of the kind," said Cicely. "Well, here's what I want," and she proceeded to read the following passage :

"THE correct classification of the arts is into two triads, namely architecture, sculpture, painting, in which the medium is spatial and consists of naturally expressive form, and music, prose, poetry, in which the medium is temporal and consists of naturally expressive tone. That in prose and poetry the actual medium consists largely of conventionally expressive sound is a point to which I must return in a moment. Another important difference is that the arts of form express primarily the outward world, the world of perception, the arts of tone primarily the inward world, the world of reflexion. I may add as regards these two triads that there is a certain parallelism, architecture or rather its more æsthetic features having analogies with music as mainly suggestive in its expression of reality, sculpture with prose as mainly direct, painting with poetry as combining direct and suggestive qualities. Architecture itself is very rarely pure art. The practical reasons for this are obvious; but there may also be an æsthetic reason, arising from the vast dimensions necessary for architectural expression, dimensions so closely associated with utility that no architect could disregard the connexion. The parallelism holds of the medium also. This is regularised in architecture and music, in the precise, often geometrical, shapes and designs of the former and in both the tones and harmonies and the time-beats of the latter—architecture, I may note has been called 'frozen music'. In sculpture and prose on the other hand the medium is unregularised, while in painting and poetry it is partly regularised, in the colour-scheme of the one and the metre and rhyme of the other. Also there is a progressive sublimation of the medium—in architecture it is fully and not merely representatively actual, in sculpture it has three dimensions, in painting two, in music it is actualised only intermittently and immaterially, in prose and poetry actualised only when articulated. I would note that in the drama, considered as pure art, the actualised elements of space and form are essentially extraneous, though a dramatist, who may have to live by the performance of his plays, must keep theatrical considerations in mind. In order however to understand fully the interrelations of the arts we must go back to their common root. That root is perhaps something in the nature of a choral folkdance in harmonious surroundings. For present purposes we may identify it with language. Language however is of two kinds or has two functions originally undifferentiated and still largely mixed, as in oratory—it is both an art-medium and a means of intercourse. In another way, especially after gesture has ceased to be an important element, it is of two kinds, spoken and written. And while the arts of tone have developed in connexion with spoken language, the arts of form, including the more expressive element in architecture, should but for extraneous influences have developed in connexion with written language—the original connexion of the arts of form with writing is evidenced, I may add,

in the twofold meaning of the Greek word γράψω. The primitive form of natural writing was what is called ideography—picture-words—that of natural speech what we may analogously call ideophony—tone-words. Used however as a means of intercourse, language soon ceased to a great extent to be naturally expressive, that is, it became conventionalised. This happened first with spoken language, the vocabulary of which came to consist of what for the most part were mere sounds rather than tones. Then, owing to the preponderance of spoken over written language, the conventions of the former were imposed upon the latter and writing not only ceased to be ideographic as speech had ceased largely to be ideophonic, but it became phonetic, a mere reflection of the mainly conventional or nontonal vocabulary of speech. In consequence it was much more thoroughly conventionalised than speech and lost almost all its natural expressiveness.

“ Now let me briefly note some of the æsthetic results of this conventionalisation of language as a means of intercourse. First regarding the arts of tone. Music employs a medium that is not very suitable for ordinary spoken intercourse ; consequently it was not greatly affected. With the other two arts of tone—absurdly called the literary arts, the arts of form being really the literary, otherwise graphic, arts—it was very different. Their media were not effectively distinguished from the spoken language of intercourse and hence to a very great extent were conventionalised through the employment of its conventional vocabulary. Only in their rhythms and cadences, in respect of which they were too far removed from ordinary conversation to be affected by the considerable conventionalisation of its intonations, did they retain adequate expressiveness. The extent of the loss may be roughly indicated by the difference in intelligibility to one ignorant of English between a piece of English music well and sympathetically rendered and a piece of English poetry equally well and sympathetically rendered. I may add, as regards vocabulary or individual words, that the best ideophones are not the directly or figuratively onomatopoeic nor the words confined to æsthetic use, like *azure*, *billow*, *steed*, *sere*, *sable*, but the words most capable of tonal expressiveness like *weary*, *dreary*, *hot*, *cold*, *love*, *hate*. Next, the large substitution of conventional for natural expressiveness has involved a further difference here. Music often expresses the external world or, to put the point in more technical language, it expresses form and especially, I should say, moving, changing form, form, that is, dependent upon temporal as well as spatial relations ; but it always expresses form indirectly through the medium of naturally expressive tone. Prose and poetry also express form ; but they do this mainly through the medium of conventionally expressive sound. Compare for instance the expression of the blank desolation of winter mainly through conventionally expressive vocables appealing directly to the eye and to sight-imagery

in Shakespeare's sonnet *That time of year*—the opening quatrain—with the expression of the throbbing exuberance of summer through naturally expressive tones appealing directly to the ear and only indirectly to the eye in Debussy's *Prélude à l'Après-Midi d'un Faune*. And owing to this loss of naturally expressive sound the appeal of prose and poetry is probably much more to the eye in comparison with the ear than otherwise would have been the case.

"AND now regarding the arts of form. Had writing been conventionalised in the same way as speech was conventionalised, that is, had ideographs escaped phoneticisation and been conventionalised on their own lines, as, I believe, has happened to some extent with Chinese writing, and among us with the Roman and still more the Arabic numerals, and in other written or figured symbolism of various kinds, it is very likely, I think, that while architecture, being dependent upon a medium unsuitable for written intercourse would not have been greatly affected, sculpture and painting would have been forced to rely upon conventionally expressive form much as prose and poetry upon similar sound. But the far more thorough conventionalisation of writing involved in phoneticisation resulted in a complete breach with the graphic arts, which lost all connexion with writing and written intercourse and developed independently. Whether this has been an advantage is questionable. I have noted already how the arts of tone can in some degree express form and spatial relations. The arts of form should also similarly, though probably in lesser degree, have been able to express both that inner world primarily expressed in tone and also temporal relations, the latter especially through such series or successions of pictures as would develop naturally from ideography or picture-writing. But apart from some fresco and relief and medieval didactic decoration—illumination, stained glass, etc.—there is, I think, very little of a serial nature in these arts, at all events in the extant remains of their early development in our and perhaps in any civilisation. Hogarth's '*Marriage à la Mode*,' which of course is not early, may be one of the best examples of it, while I don't know a better model of how such a serial art might have developed than the pictorial narrative known, I believe, as the *Way of the Cross*—to be seen in every Roman Catholic Church."

"*Stations of the Cross*," interjected Miss Wilkins.

"AND the deficiency is attributable, I think, to that solution of continuity which followed on the phoneticising of writing. The loss in internal expressiveness may be not less great. I may add that had writing not been phoneticised, poetry and artistic prose would probably have been scored somewhat as music, and then the term 'literature' would never have been applied to arts of tone. Even now writing

has a few nonphonetic features of the kind, as italics and marks of exclamation and interrogation.

"I WOULD not assert however that the conventionalisation of language, even when regarded purely as an art-medium, is an absolute evil. Within limits it is helpful. Perhaps all the arts depend in some measure upon at least partly conventional symbols. For instance in music there is deliberate and obvious convention in leading motive and there is a certain amount of convention in equal temperament. Something too of the general unintelligibility of the more adventurous modern work in all the arts may be attributed to the free use of clique-conventions."

"THE author," she went on as she glanced rapidly through the remaining introductory pages, "thinks that this unintelligibility may often be connected in other ways with the facts that he has been considering. He suggests for instance that the element of truth in Marinetti's ideas may be a sense of the deficiency in natural expressiveness of vocabulary regarded as art-medium and the element of truth in Futurism a sense of that deficiency in power to express succession and therewith the inner world of reflective mood which he attributes to the arts of form in their actual development.

"HE also has some interesting and not always very hopeful remarks on presentday English, spoken and written. Here he emphasises the failure in compounding power due primarily to the free appropriations from Latin, which have thwarted the language in its natural development. He notes especially the undignified character of modern verb-compounds like *break up*, *make over*, compared with older compounds, where the preposition was always prefixed to the verb. The failure is even greater in the written language. Thus verb-compounds like those just instanced are compounds only in speech and not in writing. Instances that I should suggest are compounds like *Exprimeminister*—this as spoken is quite good but as always written [*ex-Prime Minister*] is a monstrosity, a sheer abomination and there are other monstrosities equally repellent. The lexicographers would seem to be wanting here. Why shouldn't they reform and refine, not merely conform and define? And their definitions aren't always beyond question, as I hope one day to show in some instances from the great *Oxford English Dictionary*, starting with *apperception*. The author further holds that the meaning of words has been one of the factors in the changes they have undergone—such an influence would operate of course in the direction of greater ideophony. Similarly the form has tended to modify the meaning. An instance is the word *extraordinary*. *Extra-ordinary* is a word of very little force and the great difference here between the two forms must, he thinks, be attributed to the

scope for unusual emphasis afforded by the coalescing of the second and third syllables. The same word serves to point another great disadvantage in the Latinisation of the English vocabulary, namely the number of polysyllabic compounds. In Latin itself, in which the meaning of the elements so compounded could never be quite lost sight of, these huge words might be justified; in English their bulk, apart from occasional euphony or ideophony, is merely an encumbrance. Written English, the author also notes, is now a mixture of phonetic spelling (mainly alphabetical but also to a certain extent syllabic, as in combinations like *ough*, *tion*, syllables ending in the so-called mute *e*, and other phonetic peculiarities) and of conventional, nonexpressive ideography, namely in words like *gaol* and *colonel*—words that must be regarded as of the nature of ideographs in so far as they are alphabetically unique. The author is also very contemptuous—indeed scornful—of the phonetic reformers as persons having no conception whatever of the true nature of written language; the greater the element in written English of conventional ideography the more hopeful, he says, would be the prospect, since true ideography, which might even now be helpful to the arts of form, can develop from conventional ideography but not from an alphabeticised or other phoneticised vocabulary. And even for purposes of communication a conventional ideography, clearly recognised as such, would, he holds, really be better than any phonetic system—in which opinion I myself hardly agree with him. How far there should be correspondence between spoken and written language, how far again language as a means of communication should differ in vocabulary and in conventionalism generally from language as a medium of art are further points on which the author hardly touches.

"WELL, to conclude, his ideas, if I may speak so without presumption, fit in very well with mine and if civilisation be really entering on and—a much more doubtful point—will persevere with that tremendous resynthesis and reassimilation—I don't say reunification because the preceding analysis and differentiation so far as sound will endure—of its varied and diverse activities, then it is destined to undergo a gradual transformation of which we, who seem to be living in the critical period of transition, can form only the dimmest conception. And after all there's time enough—a million million years is the latest calculation. Isn't civilisation going to be transformed, isn't human nature itself going to change beyond all recognition long before that time has passed?"

"THEY leave providence out of their calculations," said Miss Wilkins.

"OF course," said Cicely, "necessarily they leave out the incalculable. But that needn't mean that they deny it. Let me quote some verses by a physicist friend that seem much to the point here.

'Thy works men measure and their limits fix,
 Quanta and suns and spiral nebulae,
 Spacetime, the trend in thermo-dynamics,
 With argued things that can't imagined be—
 Knowledge won through deft device in tools and tricks,
 Through question apt, laborious scrutiny.

'Around Thy measured world reigns Thy immensity.'

"BUT there's more than the spiritual to be borne in mind here. Scientists have asserted the immortality of the germplasm. Certainly the primitive germplasm may be immune to natural processes of decay. But the highly developed, highly specialised germplasm of humanity, is that similarly immune? May it not rather be senescent already? May not such deterioration be the real cause of for instance the spread of cancer? And may not a deteriorating human physique succumb to disease in other forms, to bacteria growing more virulent and formidable as the human power of resistance weakens? New knowledge and better equipment will prove perhaps a delaying, hardly an arresting factor. Ah, think of it, think of it! Man, with his superb and wondrous achievement, man, 'the heir of all the ages,' the glory of the universe, the like of whom perhaps never was nor ever will be within space-and-time limits, who expected to subdue and refashion not only his physical environment but even the 'ape and tiger' of his own baser nature—as Wordsworth expresses it,

'Serene will be our days and bright
 And happy will our nature be
 When love is an unerring light
 And joy its own security'—

man, not individual men but the whole race, become at last the living, helpless, writhing prey of the feeblest and foulest of creatures, things that produce suppurations and batten on putrescence! Well, so it all may end; on such a scene the curtain may fall. And after man what next? Could something greater 'emerge,' as they say, something surpassing man as far as man himself has surpassed the dinosaur? And what would such a race know and make and deem of us, of our works and words and reticences and makebelieves? Frida, I know what's in your mind, namely that the devil himself never yet caused tongue to wag more idly."

"I CERTAINLY think your last remarks about the earth after man very unprofitable speculation," commented Miss Wilkins.

"QUITE so," said Cicely; "after man the deluge or rather the conflagration, the *sacrum ex favilla solutum*. But personally I'm not much in love with the idea of emergence. It's looking at things the wrong way round. The psychical doesn't emerge gradually from the physical; on the contrary, the physical is penetrated gradually by the psychical—wave upon wave, so to say—and that's the real cause and meaning of progressive evolution."

"I DON'T see where creation comes in according to either fancy," said Miss Wilkins.

"DON'T you?" said Cicely, "I suggested that the psychical gradually penetrates the physical. For 'penetrates' substitute 'is infused into.' That surely will satisfy you. I should say that this infusion of the psychical in ever higher grades and the fashioning of the physical thereby into ever more meet and worthy receptacles or organs is the immediate efficient cause of evolution. That means dualism of course. Dualism, I believe, is at present a little out of fashion and favour. Yet it seems to me that dualism can be supported by very powerful argument. When one thinks how many extremely able realists there are and likewise how many extremely able idealists, one finds it impossible to believe that either realism or idealism is altogether right or altogether wrong, or to deny that there is much truth in both. One way of satisfying this consideration might be to say that idealism and realism are both partly true, that each represents a different and complementary aspect of the one monistic reality. To me it seems that you can't identify contraries in that way, that the true relations of idealism and realism, taken as universally valid, are those not of mutual complementariness but of mutual repugnance and exclusion. If this be so then the only way in which the elements of truth belonging respectively to each can be reconciled is the way of dualism, according to which the realistic idea is true of physical and the idealist of psychical reality. And such dualism accords completely with, in fact supplies a satisfactory basis for the view of evolution that I have just suggested. Anyway, goodbye to emergence, which, at all events in the nontheistic versions, violates the sufficient-reason principle from start to finish in that the progressive emergence of new qualities and powers presupposes and certainly can't in itself account for progressive intensity and elaborateness of organisation in the constituents of the new unit.² And goodbye too to Darwinism, which is contrary to an equally fundamental principle of reality."

"WHAT is that?" asked Miss Wilkins.

"YOU'VE heard, Frida," said Cicely, "of the conservation of matter, force, energy—to name its three successive versions. Well, that has gone the way of all—."

"ALL science," put in Miss Wilkins, "or at least a great deal of it."

"HARDLY," said Cicely, "nor exactly of all flesh, but of all fleshly, all anthropometric science. The conservation of energy can be saved

²Considered as a realistic and nontheistic theory of ultimate reality, emergence seems yet more at fault, as in making time too fundamental (thereby reducing absolute to a mere replica of relative truth) and in placing the value-justification of existence, if anywhere, in unrealised and perhaps never fully realisable potentialities.

today, if at all, merely as tautology. But let me propose another and a better, a nobler principle of conservation, no mere tautology, I hope, but true, necessarily true, now and for ever—the conservation of value. In the world of eternity there is, I think, a sense in which all true values are eternal themselves. In that book of our friend's verse from the introduction to which I was reading just now there is a little poem dealing with this very theme. And in a note the writer, starting from the supposition that the physical universe may long outlast intelligent life on this planet, insists that it can never become a matter of indifference whether the life lived here was lived nobly or otherwise, that it can't lose importance even with the destruction of the physical universe and of that universe's space-and-time setting—or should one rather say texture?—further that whoever is not ready to deny these assertions acknowledges thereby the eternal reality of values, in other words the reality of an eternal world. Apart however from such transcendental considerations and in relation to this world of space and time, or rather spacetime or, better, of, let's say, n dimensions, the principle should mean that no higher value can come out of a process than went into it."

"WHAT about freewill?" asked Miss Wilkins.

"TRUE," replied Cicely, "you've anticipated me. In an act of real selfdetermination there would seem to be in some unique sense a true creation or destruction of values; but in the present context the point isn't highly important. Well, applied to human history, this principle of mine simply means that as a nation—or other social entity—sows so shall it reap. Hence a nation can never profit permanently by its illdoings. Sooner or later the gains will be counterbalanced and more through injury to the national morale, through obscuring of the national insight into moral issues and moral aspects, through loss in prestige and in others' goodwill and so on. Consider here the partitions of Poland, a signal instance, I should suppose, of great collective wrong; consider the occupation of Ireland. Similarly there is no such thing as luck in history if by luck be meant what brings advantage or disadvantage that is independent as cause or effect of national character and quality, innate or traditional. Sooner or later ill luck and good luck bring the one its compensations, the other its nemesis. Thus it was in considerable measure their fortunate star that gave the Romans the dominion of the Mediterranean world; in consequence they attained to the position inadequately prepared and equipped for its dangers and difficulties and through the national deterioration and disintegration that resulted they—or what survived of them—presently sank to the level of the conquered states and races in an empire that was still administered in their name and largely in accordance with ideas and principles first conceived by them."

"THAT's all very well for nations," said Miss Wilkins; "but what about individuals?"

"I THINK," said Cicely, "that the principle holds good there too so far as the shortness and the incomparably greater vicissitudes of individual life allow it free scope. You know perhaps that line of Goethe—

'Denn alle Schuld rächt sich auf Erden.'

I wouldn't interpret that solely in relation to remorse and self-reproach. A man or woman may stifle their conscience but in doing so they commit suicide in respect of all the higher elements in their personality and thereafter will know neither true happiness nor true friendship."

"YES," said Miss Wilkins, "I know the poem. It's in our school-books. I'm not over fond of it and omit it when I can. Goethe, I think, was far too much of the earth, earthy."

"PERHAPS so," said Cicely. "But concerning this idea of the conservation of value in relation to the organic world, if the idea be valid it follows that natural selection can have been at the most a factor of change, not one of true progress and ascent. If however this consideration should appear too metaphysical—which it isn't—there are other arguments against natural selection going to the root of the matter that somehow have never been put forward."

"FOR instance, Cicely."

"WELL, Darwinists say that it's the less fit—sometimes, namely where there's no competition, they really should say unfit—that go under. But which sort of the less fit or unfit, the innately or the actually? Obviously the latter. But doesn't actual imply innate unfitness? I would suggest that the implication may be very slight, the actually unfit or less fit being mainly the young and the old, the immature and the overmature—the latter too past parentage; thus it's the too young and the too old antelope that are caught, the too young and the too old lion that fail to catch. Well, apply this argument all round, to the various forms of the struggle for existence, competitive and non-competitive, offensive and defensive, active and immobile and see how it works out.³"

³The actually less fit would also include the more or less disabled. But disablement is perhaps mainly a matter of bad luck. And the actually more fit would include the very precocious. But the connexion between precocity and innate superiority in mature life may not be great. The argument, it is true, ignores mutations. But considerable mutation viewed as a factor in evolution is beset with difficulties. Thus such discontinuity must impair organic balance and harmony. Again, the more considerable the respective mutations the less close is the correlation of variation and environment and therefore the less capable is the mutation principle of explaining adaptation at all events in its more signal and exact manifestations.

"I'm afraid," said Miss Wilkins, "the task's quite beyond me; but I feel you're right all the same—'ex ore infantium.'"

"Ah," said Cicely, "one that lisped in apophthegm and babbled paradox."

"Now take another point. Natural selection is based mainly on two principles, variation and the struggle for existence. But the two principles named tend essentially and necessarily to mutual exclusiveness—the greater the variation the less the competitive struggle. Further, the greater the variation, that is, the less the competition, the greater the evolutionary advance. And the noncompetitive struggle, rightly regarded, isn't a factor at all. But, as I shall try to show some day, there are, I think, other arguments enough and to spare for battering the whole fortress of natural selection to pieces—as for the Neo-Darwinist (otherwise Anti-Lamarck) outworks, are they not already breached beyond repair?"

"Ah, Cicely," said Miss Wilkins, "I imagine there will soon be wailing and lamenting—'Cecidit, cecidit magna Babylon.' But ours will be a triumphant *Nisi dominus*."

"Good," said Cicely. "Doesn't the poet say that

'Out of a fabulous story
We fashion an empire's glory?'

But the glamour fades and the empire passes; 'Great—greater—is truth and it prevails.' I remember reading in some scientific article that the difference between biology before and after the appearance of *The Origin of Species* was the difference between *Ante* and *Post Urbem Conditam*. Concerning which latter event Virgil declares, with reference to the many labours and wanderings of Aeneas,

'Tantæ molis erat Romanam condere gentem,'

and we say more colloquially 'Rome wasn't built in a day.' Yet Wallace—more fortunate than Aeneas—assures us that he constructed this new Rome or at least the capitol thereof with a couple of hours' hard thinking."

"WHAT went up so fast can come down even faster," said Miss Wilkins.

"TRUE," said Cicely. "What was built in a day can be wrecked in a night and then we shall be able to apply the terse summary of Tacitus—'Inter magnam urbem et nullam nox una interfuit.'"

"ANYHOW," she went on, "I believe that alike in the organic and in the social sphere the great factors of progress are not competition and conflict but interdependence (sympiosis in the widest sense) and co-operation. How much more important the latter have been appears

upon a comparison of evolution on land and in the sea respectively. The sea is enormously larger—not only is its superficial extent much greater but in the present regard the sea must be treated as three-dimension, the land as mainly two-dimension; further, barriers in the sea are far slighter. And yet progressive evolution is ever so much more advanced on land. Dr. Whitehead, in arguing briefly for this very point of the value of co-operation as compared with conflict, extends the former factor right back to the relations between proton and electron. And even Darwin himself had glimpses of this truth, as when he said⁴ that he used the term 'struggle for existence' 'in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another,' a sense in which I have failed so far to discover the metaphor but, I fear, am very sensible of the topsyturvy confusion of contraries. Anyway, the idea of co-operation, if not entirely absent from Darwin's outlook, was entirely vain and ineffective. In definitely establishing the idea of evolution and demolishing the rival special-creation idea, that is in the form in which that idea was then presented, Darwin was completely and perhaps finally successful. In propounding a particular theory of evolution, that is, in crediting progressive no less than retrograde evolution to the hardness of inanimate nature, to natural carnivorism and its analogues, to kith-and-kin rivalry and generally in booming the cockpit aspect of nature he turned biological thought into baneful paths and intensified in the worlds of thought and of action alike certain factors of a perverse and ultimately disastrous quality. Further, his influence obscured and eclipsed the work of his sounder, if less adequately equipped, forerunners much as in the opinion of Bacon, which may have been not wholly wrong, though enforced in very questionable similes, the speculations of Plato and Aristotle obscured and eclipsed the work of their also less well equipped forerunners, the physicists of Ionia.⁵

AND now regarding the social sphere. No doubt, especially in the world of practical life, competition and conflict have supplied a very powerful stimulus and further have tended to build up large entities, economic and political. But the stimulus has not always operated on the best lines. And, regarding such entities, some of them, like the Russian and Turkish empires, had better never have been built up at all, while others—the United Kingdom, for instance, if this title be still legally correct—might have been built up more surely, if more slowly, had other methods found greater play—as they did for instance in the union of 1713. Next, success in competition and conflict has been due very largely, and increasingly as larger entities were formed,

⁴THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES, sixth edition, p. 46.

⁵Transmission of modifications, admitted by Darwin himself, was perhaps the most helpful suggestion of his predecessors. But in relation to certain amazing feats of instinct performed only once in a lifetime, this theory fails as signally as natural selection.

to the co-operative elements in the successful entity. This holds to some extent even of antisocial combinations, as was noted long ago by Plato in respect of the 'honour among thieves.' Finally, as far as successful competing or fighting entities—industrial trusts or political states or empires—have been civilising factors, their influence must be attributed to the larger scope and opportunity afforded by them for co-operative activity, in industry through for instance the adoption of rationalising methods, in politics through for instance the imposition of the *Pax Romana* or the King's Peace. And the further civilisation advances, the truer, I believe, will this conception of progress as due not to mutual antagonism but to mutual goodwill become. Which is one reason why I claim to be a modern and to cultivate the forward gaze."

"I HOPE," said Miss Wilkins, "that you don't claim to be that, at all events in religious matters. Modernism is 'the quintessence of all heresies'; that's how it's summed up in the Encyclical *Pascendi* of Pope Pius the Tenth."

"I SAID 'modern,' not 'modernist,'" replied Cicely.

"ANYHOW," went on Miss Wilkins, "this forward gaze doesn't seem to bring you much comfort, especially when it results in such horrible speculations as you were unfolding a few minutes ago. Try now and then to look back, if only for a change. There's ballast at least even in secular history."

"AM I then so volatile?" asked Cicely. "The lithe Hermes of the winged-sandals emerged—so scholars say—from a massive boundary-stone, a Herm from a term, more wondrously than butterfly from caterpillar; you counsel a contrary metamorphosis."

"NOT volatile," said Miss Wilkins, "but mentally never still. You'd be all the better for a little —."

"BROMIDE of potassium perhaps."

"No, Cicely, a moral sedative rather."

"'MORE needs she the divine than the physician,' it seems. But what you call sedative I might deem narcotic."

"AH, Cicely," said Miss Wilkins with something of a sigh, "life isn't all unrest and epigram."

"NOT all," said Cicely, "tempest and lightning, not all bubbling iridescence from troubled ocean-depths, not all —"

"ENOUGH," cried Miss Wilkins; "you're making the world spin. And I think your ambition is to make it hum too."

"DOES our world," asked Cicely, "ever do otherwise than spin and hum, what with day and night and the tradewinds? And now you're turning epigrammatist yourself. I should think it a case of 'evil communications' did I not know how set, how firm—I had almost said how stark—your personality is. Well, I've tried to look back on the past, the secular past, to use your own expression, and I find it neither cheering nor edifying. I find there chiefly that great threefold injustice, those three great secular sins which our friend the nurse militant denounced so eloquently the other day, oppression of the many, oppression of the few, oppression of women. The many, that is the poor, the lowly, yes, to recall a term of mine that you evidently thought inflammatory, the untouchable. The few, those who have committed the offence, often so difficult to forgive, of being in disagreement with their age, whether their age generally or their own particular circle, artistic or scientific or what not. Injustice to women—I was partly wrong in saying that we find that in the past; the worst of it we don't find—as our friend said, the saddest pages of history are its unwritten pages—but we know full well that it was there, that all the past, could it be laid bare to us, would be full, brimful, of what our friend summed up so well as the unrecorded woes, the carefully hidden wrongs and dissembled sorrows of women. Frida, have you read those verses of mine which you took away the other night?"

"I'M sorry," said Miss Wilkins; "I put them away carefully in my notebook and forgot all about them."

"AH," said Cicely, "I fancy I know how a psychoanalyst would interpret such forgetfulness."

"To be quite frank—" began Miss Wilkins.

"COULD you ever be anything else?" interjected Cicely.

"WELL," went on Miss Wilkins, "I certainly forgot, but after what you told me, I didn't feel very happy about them."

"I KNOW," said Cicely; "I had been thinking over that phrase 'the carefully hidden wrongs and dissembled sorrows of women' and the result is those verses or rather the first two pieces."

MISS WILKINS had now produced the manuscript from her notebook. "The first poem," she remarked, "hasn't any title or rather there's a partly erased title that looks like *Remorse*."

"YES, that's it," said Cicely. "I don't know why I should have tried to erase the title unless it was because I thought that the lines might speak for themselves."

MISS WILKINS proceeded to read aloud the following lines :

Grief killed her—secret woes than storms less mild,
Less gracious. There's her portrait as a child,
Where lately one who knew that childhood not
Stood gazing, gazing and the hours forgot.
"You linger long." "Yes, how the time has sped !
'Tis such a merry little face," he said.

"H'M," ejaculated Miss Wilkins. "Is it true or merely fictitious?"

"NOT actual," replied Cicely, "but true, I believe, in the sense in which Aristotle said that poetry—if my lines be poetry—in other words reality, 'forms more real than living man'—is truer than history, otherwise fact, actuality."

"THE next piece," went on Miss Wilkins, "is called *Deceivers Ever* and there's an explanatory note 'the supposed utterance of a man sensual and cynical in his sensuality as only men can be.'"

THE lines were as follows :

O waitress at Ye Olde Ploughshare,
Sweet, gentle, childlike maid,
How feels it to be courted, dear,
And how to be betrayed?

So faithfully you kept the tryst,
Such dainty garments wore,
So fondly nestled to be kissed
And then—I came no more.

O waitress at Ye Olde Ploughshare,
How fares it with you now?
Read you in each kind word a snare
And guile on every brow?

MISS WILKINS read the lines through calmly and then broke out :
"Cicely, your mood is morbid, terribly morbid ; our friend's discourse—the friend whom Mr. Helston so aptly dubbed a nurse militant—has done you no good. Why, if you were ever to publish such verses people would think —"

"O LET them think !" exclaimed Cicely. "'Tis no matter."

"It's a very great matter," said Miss Wilkins, "to others besides yourself. You sadly need a little robust commonsense."

"COMMONSENSE !" cried Cicely disdainfully. "Frida, isn't there enough of that commodity in the world already? I tell you, in the mind's mansion commonsense is a kitchenmaid or rather a scullion and, to resort to a colloquialism, all his fingers are thumbs and everywhere you know his handiwork—dabs and daubs and botches and bunglings and ill-graced carplings at his betters after the fashion of clumsy old Johnson confuting Berkeley. No, anyone who wants to achieve anything worth anything must take leave of their commonsense."

"IN fact," put in Miss Wilkins, "of all their senses—of all his or her senses."

"HIS, her or its," said Cicely ; "why omit the neuters? Still if I've really exceeded, the next two pieces make some amends to the

other sex. The one satisfies every canon, if not of poetry, at all events of propriety. The other, I have such hardihood as to think, might please a nun and edify a vestal virgin."

THE verses were as follows :

SELINA.

Selina's eyes are large and brown
And, courting with her sailor-boy,
They never looked demurely down
But laughed and shone for joy.

Each glance spoke then of future days
Nor would you blither glances see ;
Today the past was in her gaze
And none could sadder be.

Today the large brown eyes I knew
As frankly still their story told
And shone, but, ah, with glistening dew,
Not as they shone of old.

" SAD too, like the rest," said Miss Wilkins when she came to the end ; " but the right spirit at least."

TO A DEPARTED SAINT.

When in thy earthly guise
Thou seemed'st to crave release,
Those fair, uplifted eyes
I judged Earth's masterpiece.

No thoughts o'erbold were mine
Nor greatly now I claim—
A votary at thy shrine
Who tends a votive flame.

" YES," said Miss Wilkins, " that especially makes a welcome change and gives me better hope. And now try to write something about women like the Little Sisters who were begging here last week."

" AND might," said Cicely, " be ordered just anywhere at a few hours' notice—' I have only to pack my clothes and go.' ' Against nature,' some will say. Ah, yes, but they've taken vows of obedience and," she went on, smiling, " as Bacon has it, '*Natura non nisi parendo imperatur*'. Of such stuff are the world-conquerors and they make Napoleon gazing eastward from the Kremlin or Alexander gazing eastward across the Hydaspes seem less than small. Isn't that plain speaking, Frida ?"

MISS WILKINS smiled hesitatingly. Then she remarked : " There are some more verses here called *The Mistletoe-Bough*. I've always liked that air, perhaps for its associations."

" So have I," said Cicely ; " its a haunting melody. Yes, this is the past, the dreadful past again. But there is in the mistletoe an actual contrast of merriment and horror exceeding the contrast afforded by the gruesome story you refer to. Do you know the writings of Frazer, our great anthropologist ?"

"I DID read something of his a year or two ago," replied Miss Wilkins, "for some special purpose that I don't recall just now. I can't say that I was greatly interested, though I found the descriptions of magical ideas and practices instructive as showing how grievously poor fallen human nature can go astray."

THE verses were as follows :

All ye lads and lasses, go,
Kiss beneath the mistletoe,
Freely in the years of youth,
Gaily ere the years of ruth.
Ah, behind your playful rite
What a waste of woeful night
And behind your thoughtless glee
What a wealth of tragedy !
While the human spirit wandered
Down blind paths or endless ways
And its fair endowment squandered
Round and round the magic-maze.
And, for it had nor guide nor clue,
Erring far, to save it slew,
Seeking life to reinspire
In the life-destroying fire,
Lit with giant oaks entangled
By the golden bough that spangled.

All ye lads and lasses, go,
Kiss beneath the mistletoe
And reck not of the golden bough.

"EXCELLENT lines," said Miss Wilkins, as she returned the paper, "though also a trifle morbid, if I've really taken in their gist."

"HECTIC—pathological perhaps," suggested Cicely.

"As you please," said Miss Wilkins, "you have a truer sense for the *mot juste*. And though I've no great liking myself for the frolicsome side of things, I would counsel you to follow your own counsel—think less of the golden bough and more of the mistletoe."

"It may come to that yet," said Cicely. "Or perhaps I'll take to attempting verse in one of the fashionable styles, like for instance a poem I was reading the other day in an up-to-date magazine. Poem I call it, else I shouldn't know what name to apply. But it wasn't written either as verse or as prose; the thing just seemed to sprawl across the page more like, I thought, a knocked-out bruiser than anything else, and one couldn't help feeling sorry for it. And the language was incredibly precious—and precious incomprehensible."

"WHAT was it about?" asked Miss Wilkins.

"*Arcturus*," replied Cicely, "almost, I believe, the brightest of the stars—perhaps the 'bright star' of Keats's last sonnet. At least the author said it was about *Arcturus* and I would agree so far that to me it really did seem to be as much about *Arcturus* as about anything else."

"No doubt," said Miss Wilkins, "he thought the stars a fit subject for finical treatment."

"WITHOUT doubt," said Cicely. "I thought the author fit subject for clinical treatment."

"MEANWHILE," said Miss Wilkins, "I'd rather see more verses like those of yours I chanced upon the other day, ending, I believe,

' Ah, had I wisdom's golden key,
Stowed in a pocket,
I'd yield it for a golden lock,
Showed in a locket.'

But try a religious subject, yes, something on the Little Sisters, something like"—here she paused as if in doubt.

"Go on," said Cicely; "you're not often irresolute."

"I TRUST I'm betraying no confidence," said Miss Wilkins; "but one of my fellow-teachers lent me some days ago a copy of a poem by her sister, who is a nun belonging to an enclosed order, I don't at this moment recall which, and I think I have the verses by heart."

"WELL," said Cicely, "you may reckon upon an at least attentive audience."

"It's entitled *My Earthly Home*," said Miss Wilkins, and then recited the following lines, pausing here and there as her memory momentarily failed her.

Sweet convent walls that keep me fast
And keep the fragrance of the place,
Which else these bounds had overpassed
And far diffused itself in space!
Stone walls a paradise can make
And iron bars to freedom wake.

Sweet convent bell that ringest to all
The round of daily observance, may
I never lingering hear the call
Nor ever repining till that day
When thy clear note unheard shall ring
A *Finis* to my sojourning.

Sweet convent garden and thou nook,
Sweet graveyard, veiled in evergreen,
I love thy calm, thy restful look;
Yet those rest not—unheard, unseen,
They labour still in prayer for good
To all the mortal sisterhood.

Sweet convent chapel, O how blest
Thy peace beyond the world's rude roar!
The tired mind can there find rest,
And, rested so, can rise and soar;
There single contemplation dwells
And common adoration swells
And time and place are felt to be
The threshold of eternity.

"WELL," asked Miss Wilkins, when she had finished, "what have you to say about them? Couldn't you too write in that vein?"

"THEY are subdued," said Cicely; "they don't sparkle.

'Away! Your lover's heart is free,
With every maid he'll chatter.'
'What then? He'll whisper but to me
And only whispers matter.'

'Of smiles he's lavish as the sun,
There's not a maid he misses.'
'Yes, smiles he has for everyone
And keeps for me his kisses.'

But I'll have a copy of the poem some time if I may."

"I'LL write it down at once," said Miss Wilkins.

"No, bring me a copy tomorrow."

"ALWAYS 'tomorrow,' Cicely," said Miss Wilkins, somewhat disappointed. "I think you really must have some Spanish blood in you."

"AH," said Cicely,

'Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow.'

But the verses are monochrome, monochrome, not many-coloured like life; perhaps 'the white radiance of eternity'. Yes, bring me a copy tomorrow. Just a moment now while I exercise here a little gentle persuasion."

"FOR goodness sake, Cicely," cried Miss Wilkins, "for goodness sake, kill it—murder it, if that's the word you fancy."

"Now that it has regaled itself in some measure at least," said Cicely, "I'm doing my best to induce it to quit."

"I CONSIDER it's really wrong," said Miss Wilkins, "to allow the creature to bite like that."

"SUCK," said Cicely; "mosquitoes suck, being equipped therefor with a most delicate piston-apparatus, which I should be sorry to put finally out of action."

"WELL, then, suck," went on Miss Wilkins; "the word's no consequence. You're wilfully exposing yourself to the risk of blood-poisoning and worse. Only yesterday I was reading of a mosquito-bite that ended fatally."

"To bitten or biter?" asked Cicely. "You don't answer, so I must conclude to bitten. Well then, let me adopt a Cleopatra-pose

*An earlier version of the above lines has been published in the *Westminster Gazette*.

and talk of the baby 'that sucks the nurse asleep'. But worse things still might be said of me. Am I not comforting an enemy? Yes, men have roughhewed the League to enforce peace and already it's beginning to be shaped to ends of war—war against a common enemy that must be fought not with soldiers and explosives, but with serums and phagocytes. And some are contending today that the Roman Empire and Roman civilisation went down before the onslaught of not the barbarian nor even the tax-collector but the mosquito or rather the mosquito-parasite—all just for lack of a Ronald Ross, whose lucubrations—and lubrications—would have helped them to asphyxiate this really delightful creature on the very threshold of her imago-career. Ah, there, my hustling has proved successful at last and may she be as fortunate in her next host."

"WHICH delightful creature, Cicely?" asked Miss Wilkins.

"BOTH perhaps," answered Cicely. "Both, I hope, are delightful creatures, though not, I hope, both bloodsuckers. Well, a mosquito-suck never did me any greater harm than a little skin-irritation."

"WHAT about the irritation of others?" asked Miss Wilkins.

"THAT too," replied Cicely, "was only skin-deep."

"Do you really mean," asked Miss Wilkins, "that you don't approve of the slaughter, the extermination of such pests?"

"I REALLY mean," replied Cicely in a tone that had become challenging, aggressive even, "that I hate all killing, necessary or otherwise, further that I approve altogether of the extermination of those pests, the slaughterhouses."

"I THINK," said Miss Wilkins, "that they should be regulated, reformed perhaps, not exterminated."

"AND I hope," continued Cicely, "that the time isn't very remote when most reputable people will think about such institutions as most reputable people would think even now about a certain lady of my acquaintance and her meal of pet-rabbit. At least the story goes that a friend, visiting one day, found her with a rabbit visibly in her lap and, visiting again a few weeks later, found her with the rabbit invisibly in her stomach—so much closer together, so much truer bosom-companions had they grown in the interval. And on both occasions maybe the said friend was assured by her that she liked the rabbit very much. And unless she disgorged her treasure, there can be no doubt that by the next visit it had become her own flesh and blood and let's hope that affection grew by what she fed on."

"SHOCKINGLY bad taste on her part, I own," said Miss Wilkins, smiling.

"I WOULD like to think," said Cicely, "that it was shocking-bad taste in her mouth. But, ah, man—and woman too—"

'In form how like an angel, in thought how like a god!'
and withal in diet a carnivore, a hypocannibal."

"THERE, Cicely," said Miss Wilkins, "you're beginning to run amok again, as Mr. Helston called it the other day. It's what always happens sooner or later."

"FAR better my amok," said Cicely, "than other people's—well, the reverse of amok."

"WHAT'S that?" asked Miss Wilkins.

"REVERSE it," replied Cicely; "spell it backwards."

"OTHER people's K, A—no K, O, M, A; other people's coma?"

"EXACTLY," said Cicely.

THERE was a pause, a little defiant on the one side, a little bewildered on the other. It was ended by the unannounced entry of a burly, bustling woman, obviously not of the gentry-class, with an awkward gait and a pretentious demeanour.

"ARE you two damsels—I beg pardon—are you two ladies voters?" she asked as she plumped down unceremoniously in an inviting easy-chair.

"No," answered Cicely; "we haven't yet reached a woman's years of discretion. We are both still within—well within—our twenties."

"THAT's a pity," replied the visitor, looking a little disappointed.
"No doubt you'll soon 'ave the flappers' vote."

"WHAT about the floppers' vote?" said Miss Wilkins, turning to Cicely.

"TRUE, Frida," said Cicely. "Well, we shall soon have what the would-be-smart little boys that write leaders in, let's say, the *Daily Mail*, or the would-be-wise men-of-the-world that get large type in *The Times* or who-knows-what organ of manly prejudice are pleased to call the flapper-vote. *Flapper* comes, I suppose, from *flap* and to flap one's wings is to make a great todo over nothing, like the militant suffragettes before the war, or rather over what others affect to regard as nothing, and to flip is to dismiss all such todo and to treat it superciliously like the said would-be-smart little boys. But whether flappant or flippant be fitter to exercise the vote perhaps doesn't become me to say."

"O CICELY," exclaimed Miss Wilkins, "what a smart little girl! But whether fitter to call you flappant or flippant —"

"You mean," said Cicely, "what fireworks, what flip-flap!"

"WELL," said the visitor, "if I can't supplicate your votes, I can supplicate your hoffices, your good hoffices."

"PERHAPS they're not good," suggested Cicely.

"No fear o' that," she replied, "I reads women like books."

"Do you read many books?" asked Cicely.

"NOT as many as I reads women," she answered.

"NOT so well worth reading, perhaps," observed Cicely.

"Jus' so," she replied. "An' now concernin' my business today. My name's Mrs. Duffin, proprietress o' the highly hestimated groceries-hestablishment in Cuckoo Lane an' I'm 'ere today to canvass for the Hindependent candidate for Parliament, Mr. Tidmarsh."

"WHY does he stand as an Independent?" asked Cicely.

"BY reason," she answered, "of 'is sanitary hinclinations. I mean w'at 'e's mos' p'tic'larly out for his sanitary reparations. 'E's great on sanity in the 'ouses an' workshops o' the poor an' gen'ally.

"OH," said Cicely, "I agree that the need for sanity is pretty general, not more among the poor than elsewhere."

"THAT's 'cause your likes does'n' know the poor nor w'at they've got to put up with," she answered a little reproachfully. "Now Mr. Tidmarsh proposes goin' about among the electors o' Wilmingham an' keep repeatin': 'The burnin', blazin' question o' the day is the cryin' need for more sanity in Wilmingham.' An' in this way 'e 'opes to convince the electors that 'e's the mos' highly heligible personage to personate 'em in the nex' Parliament."

"I SHOULD think," observed Cicely, "that if he goes about saying that he'll very soon convince them about his eligibility or rather his suitability for some domicile where there's less sanity than even in Wilmingham or Westminster. Or rather less reputed sanity—'minorities,' it is said, 'must suffer,' and one form of such suffering is to be shut up in prisons and asylums and kept from mischief."

"SANITY," went on Mrs. Duffin ardently, "is our cryin' need. We wants to make a clean sweep o' the dirty varmints w'at aboun's 'ere. P'r'aps you knows the 'arm such things perpetuates."

"YES," said Cicely, "they carry about all manner of germs."

"GERMS!" said Mrs. Duffin scornfully; "bless yer, is that the len'th an' brea'th o' your knowledge o' the matter?"

"YES, that's our superficial knowledge of it," replied Cicely.

"I CONSIDERS," said Mrs. Duffin, "yer wants hinformin' sadly."

"ON the contrary," said Cicely, "we want it most eagerly. Can you impart any?"

"I CAN part with a great deal," she answered, "if you gives your hattention. Now first these varmint's bites mos' unmerciful—makes yer feel like a mutton-chop w'ats bein' eaten alive."

"IN other words," said Cicely, "put you in quite a sympathetic mood."

"IF scratchin' your body raw an' cursin' your 'ead off, if that's w'at yer calls bein' put in a sympathetic mood, I agrees," said she. "But there's worse things nor that comes from varmint's."

"WORSE than being eaten alive?" asked Cicely.

"JUS' listen," she said, "while I tells you a very sad story about these varmint's. I didn't 'ave it firs' 'an', min' you, but the nex' bes' thing."

"THAT means secondhand, I suppose," said Cicely.

"I DUNNOW 'bout that," said Mrs. Duffin.

"ANYHOW," said Cicely, "it was the next best or the best next thing."

"HEXAC'LY," answered Mrs. Duffin. "An' now for my story. She was a gal, a fine-lookin' 'un too, the sort the lads goes mad on, an' she was sittin' at table with 'er mouth wide open jus' as you or me might do. Well, an you please, up comes one o' those varmint's, a beetle, an' runs along the table an' climbs onto 'er tongue an', afore she knows it's there, jumps down 'er throat."

"HEAVENS!" said Cicely, "I've sometimes had people jumping down my throat, but never beetles."

"Do you know a beetle's 'abits?" asked Mrs. Duffin.

"No," said Cicely; "tell us about them."

"WELL," she said, "they multiply that fast."

"EXCELLENT readyreckoners in fact," put in Cicely.

"EXCELLENT what?" asked the other.

"EXCELLENT readyreckoners."

"YES," said she, "that 'its the nail wi' the 'ead—excellent reckoners. Well, no sooner does this beetle land on 'er hentrails but it starts multiplyin'. Indeed it's suspected, so to say, o' doin' that on the table even afore it leaps down 'er throat."

"A MULTIPLICATION-TABLE and a readyreckoner," said Cicely; "quite a respectably equipped varmint."

"WELL, to assume the story," said Mrs. Duffin, "the beetle multiplies an' multiplies."

"AND then, I suppose," said Cicely, "comes a day of reckoning."

"THEY couldn't be reckoned," said Mrs. Duffin; "they was hin-numerable. In no time the poor gal's li'l better nor a sack o' multiplyin' beetles, all squeezed together."

"NOT even standing-room," suggested Cicely.

"EAT up by 'em," went on Mrs. Duffin. "So now there wasn' nothin' for it but to take 'er to a specialist."

"SPECIALIST in what?" asked Cicely.

"SPECIALIST in what!" repeated Mrs. Duffin. "Lor', miss or ma'm, yer dunnow much about specialists."

"APPARENTLY not," said Cicely.

"A SPECIALIST," said Mrs. Duffin sententiously, "is a man w'at tells you whether you're goin' to live or goin' to die—an' mos'ly 'e tells you wrong."

"BETTER then not to know very much about them," said Cicely. "Better toss up and take even risks."

"WELL," said Mrs. Duffin, "the specialist says she's got to die, she's got to be killed an' the sooner done the better, only for that you wants a special permit from his Majesty hisself."

"DID they get it?" asked Cicely.

"SURE enough," said Mrs. Duffin. "Down it comes by return o' post an' with it a letter full o' congratulation for the relations, an' the permit signed by the King hisself an' undersigned by his Sectary for Forlorn Affairs."

"WHY the Secretary for Foreign Affairs?" asked Miss Wilkins.

"SOM'UN 'ad to undersign," said Mrs. Duffin; "helse 'twas hin-
valuable. An' this affair was forlorn an ever an affair was."

"It's because of the beetles perhaps," said Cicely. "Beetles like
Bolshies are a menace to our civilisation. And the only difference
is that Bolshies devour people from without and beetles from
within."

"YES," said Mrs. Duffin, "that's it. I've heard them Bolshies was
worse nor hannibals, swallerin' people alive. It's a hestablished fact."

"PITY their victims hadn't the habits of beetles," remarked Cicely.

"YES," said Mrs. Duffin, "that'd be a blessed rettibootion."

"Too good for them," remarked Miss Wilkins.

"STILL," said Cicely, "give even them their due. However great the
enormities of the present regime in Russia, in judging it we must
remember what went before. In condemning the Cheka scorpion
let us not forget the Third-Section whip—or the Cossack knout.
We had in here a night or two ago an Anarchist of the old nonresistant
type. For all his pacificism he was quite violently and virulently Anti-
English; in fact he infuriated another visitor by suggesting a film
of the Battle of Jutland to be entitled *Scheer Folly or Britannia at Sea*
and by asking on which playing-fields was St. Quentin lost. The
occasion of this outburst was the reading aloud by the same visitor
from the book of our friend from which I was reading myself a few
minutes ago of some lines expanding the inscription for the fallen
in the War inscribed, I believe, above the entrance to the War-
cemetery in France—'Their name liveth for evermore'—

' All future ages shall their story know;
To all of time that yet remains
Shall gleam their standards and their bugles blow
Reverberating strains.'

But for all his violence our Anarchist friend did bring home to me
at least what a terrible thing Tsardom had been for Russia from the
days of that awful despot Ivan the Terrible down to the days of
Nicholas the Second, of Nicholas, Alix—and Rasputin. And when
he described Imperial Russia of quite modern times and enumerated
its long tale of crimes, the Hungarian rebellion frustrated, the Polish
rebellion so savagely put down, oppression of the other alien national-
ities—Finns, Letts, Jews and the rest—oppression of the peasantry and
working classes, oppression of religious dissentients, the dire sufferings
inflicted on reformers and revolutionaries and the flower of the nation,
the misgovernment and maladministration, fatuous and perverse

beyond belief, the calculated sacrifice of the Armenians, the faithlessness of the last Tsar in respect of the liberties that he had conceded, when, having told all this, he came to the downfall of Tsardom and the final scene at Ekaterinburg, so far from being afflicted by that exit, I found myself repeating in my haste the line of Homer—

ὥς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅστις—

"No use quoting Greek to me," put in Miss Wilkins.

"WELL, then let me try Latin, Tacitus—*Pereat qui cuncta perdere festinat; opprimatur ne omnes opprimat*. Atrocious sentiments without doubt; but when people talk in horror about the tragedy of the Pseudo-Romanoff family, I think of the far greater tragedies of their victims, of, for instance, the Jewish maiden—at least her name smacks of Judaism—Sophia Ginsberg, one worth a shipload of Tsars and Tsaritsas, one that, misguided perhaps in life and death, might yet under a more fortunate star have proved herself even another St. Joan."

"I've never heard of her," said Miss Wilkins; "but I do think the end of the Russian Imperial family very tragic indeed."

"DESCRIBING them so," said Cicely, "doesn't make it any more tragic. Civilisation may be the poorer for that deed of violence but not greatly, I fancy, for that loss of royal blood. Six or seven ordinary people, quite ordinary, Frida; *Cucullus*, it is said, *non facit monachum* and, similarly, *Corona non facit monarchum*. And only by so regarding them can we do them justice and pity them in their sufferings. Strip off all the Imperial glamour, regard Nicholas Romanoff and his wife Alix as two ordinary people, extraordinary only in respect of the miserable atmosphere of makebelieve and sycophancy and the rest in which their lives had been passed, then and only then can you judge them leniently in respect of the woeful system or rather perhaps chaos of misgovernment and tyranny that they sought to perpetuate and the reckless deeds to which they were parties, then only can you feel the tragedy in their end—*mentem mortalia tangunt*. But in goodness name let us do the same by Wilhelm von Hohenzollern, an abler and more interesting person, and respecting his vagaries remember those two ill-assorted abnormalities, the by-right-divine sceptre in the one hand and the natural disability of the other.

"BUT—to return to the case of Russia—here in the wise West, when we wring our hands over the horrors of Bolshevism, don't let us forget the preceding horrors nor let us overlook our own part in preparing the way for the Bolshevik triumph. If the Cadet party failed, if even Nihilism has made way for Bolshevism, Tolstoi and Kropotkin for Lenin and Stalin, responsibility for that change extends far beyond the frontiers of Russia."

"How?" asked Miss Wilkins.

"It was before our time," said Cicely; "but the little that I have read seems to me on the whole to justify the Anarchist's remarks on this matter. Had our attitude towards the old regime in Russia been always in everything what—owing to the influence of Jewish magnates—it was always in one thing, the sporadic outbursts against the Jews, and—owing to the state of mind occasioned by the Japanese War—it was for a brief period in everything, Bolshevism might well never have raised its head at all. Think how much that brief support of the reform movement—the lifting of the veil and the outspoken comment—effected for Russia; to it in no small measure may be attributed the granting of autonomy to the Finns and of a real and liberal constitution to the Russians themselves—a phase of real progress, a gleam of true hope. But the phase was brief and the gleam fugitive. Before we would not speak out—in the case of Conservatives largely, I suspect, from a snobbish fear of offending Queen Victoria and her Court, in the case of Liberals largely owing to the religious prepossessions of Gladstone, who could use plain enough language about Turkey and Austria—and afterwards again we would not speak out because we wanted Russia as ally in the impending war. France with greater excuse was also a greater offender and it was information furnished by the Paris police that led to the arrest of Sophia Ginsberg. In fact the decline in the French birthrate, through necessitating alliance with and support of the Russian autocracy, seems to have been a prime factor in the final catastrophe."

"Ah," said Miss Wilkins, "that may well be so. Those who disregard the injunction 'Increase and multiply' do so at their own and the general peril."

"PERHAPS so," said Cicely, "but such morals need to be pointed circumspectly. Anyway, that courageous declaration of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman—'*La Douma est morte; vive la Douma!*'—was perhaps our last effort towards dispersing the clouds that were fast gathering again. And after that, well, silence here and there increasing gloom, increasing perplexity till the storm broke."

"WERE there not always conspiracies being discovered in Russia?" asked Miss Wilkins.

"I DON'T know," replied Cicely. "But I know that there was always one conspiracy, never discovered, here, a conspiracy of silence. It is said that Voltaire at a convivial meeting was called upon for a story about robbers. 'Gentlemen,' he said, 'once upon a time there lived a farmer-general,' the reference being to the rapacious farmers of the revenue in that terrible eighteenth-century France. Similarly if

one were asked to tell a tale about liars and could properly equate *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*, one might, I think, safely begin—"Ladies and gentlemen, there was once a foreign correspondent".

"RUNNING amok again," said Miss Wilkins. "And perhaps the suppression was done over here and done for what seemed good reason."

"OR censored out there," said Cicely; "yes, I forgot that. Still newspapers aren't enlightening. Windows perhaps looking onto the larger world. But the glass is stained and its texture faulty, presenting the view coloured and distorted to accommodate the particular prejudices of readers and proprietors. And so I prefer the inner chamber of my own thoughts."

THERE was a momentary pause and then Miss Wilkins resumed. "Cicely," she said earnestly, "you can't really wish to defend those persecuting atheists, nay worse than atheists."

"NOT defend," said Cicely, "only understand. But, regarding their antitheism, I think it is largely accounted for by two things that must seem to them to be mutually corroborative, a general theory and a particular experience. The general theory, which had a considerable vogue in Europe during the nineteenth century, is as follows. Ministers of religion are the hirelings—partly dupes, partly accomplices—of the wealthy and powerful, by whom they are paid and supported to teach the oppressed first that the good and bad things of this short life are as nothing compared with the happiness and misery of the eternal life to come, secondly,—what they really don't teach—that such future happiness is to be gained by passive acceptance of the place which has been assigned to us individually here. And the particular experience is the use under the Tsarist regime of the Orthodox Church, from the Holy Synod down, I suppose, to the pope and *papadina* of every little *mir* or collection of *mir*s, for a purpose far too closely resembling the purpose asserted in the general theory. Well, that theory and that experience combined supply, so it seems to me, what I certainly won't call an excuse, but an extenuation or at least an explanation in relation to Bolshevist atheism and antitheism."

DURING this long argument Mrs. Duffin had kept her eyes fixed pretty constantly on Cicely, interested not in her words, of which she understood little, but in her animated posture and expression. Now, however, as Cicely paused, she bethought herself once more of her mission and coughed significantly and somewhat impatiently.

"I MUST beg your pardon," said Cicely; "I fear I have been allowing myself great liberties. But concerning this unfortunate girl whose sad fate you were describing, how was the execution carried out?"

"HEXECUTION!" exclaimed Mrs. Duffin with indignation. "There wasn't no hexecution. She wasn't a murderess to be hung, drawn an' quartered, just a poor gal hexcruciated by varmint. I tell yer there wasn't no hexecution. She was jus' put to sleep in a sleepin' chamber."

"LETHAL chamber, you mean," interposed Cicely.

"YES, that's w'at I means. An' there she snoozed off just as you or me might do of an afternoon, an' the only difference that we comes to an' she didn't."

"THE chief difference at all events," commented Cicely.

"AN' now," continued Mrs. Duffin, raising her voice, "that's the sort o' thing that Mr. Tidmarsh an' me is hup against an' it's to stop that sort o' thing that 'e's goin' to Parliament. An' 'is election-cry, to rouse the electors, as'll soon be plastered all over Wilmingham, is 'Sen' Tidmarsh to Westminster an' you'll 'ave so much the less varmint an' so much the more sanity in Wilmingham.'"

"IS Mr. Tidmarsh a resident here?" asked Cicely.

"'COURSE 'e is," replied Mrs. Duffin, "resident an' native too; hotherwise there wasn't no point in the election-cry."

"WELL then," said Cicely, "will you pardon me if I make a proposal?"

"I DOESN' see why you wants pardon," said Mrs. Duffin, "'less it's a himproper proposal an' then best not make it at all."

"PERHAPS I should make the proposal directly to Mr. Tidmarsh himself," said Cicely.

"TAINT no use, miss, your makin' proposal to Mr. Tidmarsh," said Mrs. Duffin, "'e's twice married already."

"WHAT! Sending a bigamist to Parliament?" asked Cicely.

"I DUNNOW w'at yer means by that," said Mrs. Duffin; "only I don't likes the sound of it; soun's hoffensive some'ow."

"A BIGAMIST," said Cicely, "is a man with two wives."

"AN' 'oo ever said Mr. Tidmarsh 'as two wives?" asked Mrs. Duffin. "Is wives wasn't contemporan'ous. That ain't Ned Tidmarsh's way. They succeeds each other. An' an you wants to make a third, you'll 'ave to wait a wee."

"WELL then, may I make a suggestion?" asked Cicely.

"LET's 'ear," said Mrs. Duffin.

"YOU say your election-cry is to be 'Send Tidmarsh to Westminster and you'll have so much the less vermin and the more sanity in Wilmingham.'"

"YES, you 'ave it by 'eart already."

"WELL," said Cicely, "why not put it this way: 'Send Tidmarsh away from Wilmingham and you'll have so much the more vermin and the less sanity at Westminster?'"

"WRITE it down," said Mrs. Duffin, "an' I'll think it over. Ain't got the hang of it quite."

"ANYWAY," said Cicely, "whichever cry you adopt, it ought, as you say, to rouse the electors. I'd like to see it placarded in the hospitals as well, especially where there are patients suffering from depressed spirits."

"MR. TIDMARSH isn't no upholder o' spirits neither," said Mrs. Duffin; "his proclivities his teetotal. Well, to close the hintervoo," she added, rising and nearly carrying the easychair with her, "will you 'elp us? Remember the cry—'Sen' Tidmarsh to Westminster an' you'll 'ave all the less varmint an' all the more sanity in Wilmingham.'"

"HELP you!" said Cicely, "why, with all my strength. And your election-cry should go straight to the hearts of the electors:

'One touch of nature makes the whole world kin.'

"TRUE," commented Mrs. Duffin; "I've as good as said so misself many times."

"AS good and very likely better," said Cicely.

AND NOW, having finished her say, Mrs. Duffin picked up her umbrella from the table and with a somewhat perfunctorily-voiced valediction—"Good morning, ladies and al'ys 'appy to 'ave your esteemed commands"—trudged out and down the stairs with irresilient footsteps and was gone.

WHEN they were alone again, Cicely remarked—"I've never yet encountered a bison; but, allowance made for the contrasts of nature and convention, otherwise of prairie and Cuckoo Lane, I fancy that this must be the next best thing."

MISS WILKINS laughed. "I was just recalling," she said, "what Mr. Helston, looking back on his war-experiences, said of you the other day."

"WHAT was that?" asked Cicely.

"'PRY that Cicely was never in a dugout to enliven the inmates.'"

"DID he say 'enliven' or 'enlighten'?" asked Cicely.

"Now that you ask me," replied Miss Wilkins, "I really can't be sure. Perhaps it was 'brighten.'"

Regarding the objection taken by one of the characters to the view that science appeals to reason, art to emotion, I would suggest the following points as affording the only basis for a sound analytical psychology. The action-unit of thought, whether sensational, perceptual, ideational, consists ordinarily of two phases, the one receptive, the other reactive—reaction, for instance Newton's reaction to the fall of an apple, need not involve external activity—the one consisting of thought (impression) and interest (affect), the other of interest (desire) and thought (self-expression). Intermediate between these phases there may be an act of self-determined choice, namely where there is conflict between a qualitatively higher and a quantitatively stronger motive. Such choice is the only true willing—either free will or no will (*voluntas aut libera aut nulla*). Effort, mental or bodily, due to desire need not involve any real willing and force of character springs largely from mental harmony and integration. Nor again is will essentially related to action or to practical life. The relations between thought and interest are such that receptive thought *A* always involves receptive interest *a*, reactive interest *b* always involves reactive thought *B*. And there is a uniform value-correspondence. Thus if the receptive thought be refined, the receptive interest will be correspondingly refined; if the former be intense but crude, the latter will be correspondingly intense and crude. And similarly as regards reactive interest and reactive thought. It would be vain to object that different persons are affected very differently by similar impressions or that similar desires lead to very different self-expressions. Externally similar experiences may make very different internal impressions; compare the respective impressions of a painter and an engineer visiting first an exhibition of pictures, then one of mechanical inventions. Similarly, desires describable in the same words may be in content far apart. Next, no state of mind can be one of either predominant thought or predominant interest (whether affect or desire). It would be vain to bring forward such a contrast as that of one person in a passion over a personal insult and another meditating quietly a problem of philosophy. The passion is the outcome of a big—perhaps swollen—notion of self, the *ego*, and of its outrageous belittlement and the desire and act (or plan) of retaliation are similarly akin. In other words, interest is intense—and crude—and thought is intense—and crude. The meditation on the other hand, if really as tranquil as it seems—an improbable supposition—is meditation in which the thought is refined rather than intense and the interest is of like character. A work of art, like a scientific treatise, seeks to present a truth essentially integral and complete and, while truth in art is of the concrete, in science of the abstract order, the relations between thought and interest are the same in both.

P. J. HUGHESDON.

COMMUNICATIONS.

SCOUTING AND WOODCRAFT—PRESENT AND POSSIBLE.*

I.

HERE is a very careful record, a readable summary, a fair-minded reviewing, of the various movements of essentially rural and open-air education; best known by their largest and best known grouping, the Boy Scouts, yet also with kindred developments; as notably the Seton Indians—now enlarged into the American Woodcraft League, and the Order of Woodcraft Chivalry, initiated by the late Perceval Westlake, and continued by his son. Kibbo Kift, the Woodcraft Kindred, is also clearly set forth; with other as yet smaller movements. This book is thus of real interest and value to every one who is becoming awakened to such current endeavours, which are nothing less than the vital emancipation of childhood, boyhood, girlhood, and youth generally, from the still prevalent verbalistic empapement, of merely or mostly bookish mis-instruction, officialised and examination-ridden as this mostly is. Since even in the most conventional schools, there are good teachers struggling with such adversities, and seeking the way towards education indeed—through coming into relation with real life, and advancing it—in very deed, through contact with nature and its many interests, its fundamental occupations also—this survey of so many of the best endeavours of our passing generation will be found at once interesting and helpful.

THE world-wide gathering of some 50,000 Boy Scouts at their Birkenhead "Jamboree" last year was in fact nothing short of the most conspicuous expression of the victories of this renewal of education; as surely even head-masters, and Boards of Education, at all levels of magnitude and authority, must have begun to see, let alone many parents for their own young folks. So this book is opportune, and should win the wide circulation its broad and fair-minded record of endeavours and progress deserves.

ALL this the more since the second portion of the volume is devoted to similarly intelligent and readable presentment of "the Woodcraft Culture," which "as a system of education and social service, bids fair to transform modern life . . . surely because it fulfils a need that industrialism leaves unsatisfied." Successive chapters discuss woodcraft as sport and adventure, and as actively and vitally initiative for science, art, and literature. Its ceremonial practices are explained as renewals from man's early past, and its ethical and even re-religious values are likewise outlined, its helpfulness towards sex-education also; while the book concludes with a broad indication of woodcraft as preparatory to world service. The index and bibliography are also carefully done: so in all ways this book meets a real want of teachers' and scholars' libraries, as well as public ones, and of parents' shelves as well. It is interesting to note that our author seems most to approve the Co-operative Woodcraft Fellowship.

II.

YET now, with practically all sides of this in so many ways excellent movement now clear before us, the question arises—how comes it, that, with all this growth of a generation behind it, it has not got farther—and that the vast mass of our instructional machinery, primary, secondary and higher, is still so little affected after all, and thus goes on as it does? Primarily, of course, this but illustrates the slowness of all great social and intellectual changes. Thus, though not only Pasteur's main achievements with the

*I. O. EVANS. *WOODCRAFT AND WORLD SERVICE—Studies in Unorthodox Education: an Account of the Evolution of the Woodcraft Movements.* London, Noel Douglas. 1930. (6s.)

germ-theory, but Lister's specific application of it to surgery, were well-known to science before 1870, it was not until the Great War, a generation and a half later, that all sides were equipped for antiseptic surgery—indeed hardly fully then : and of the like slow developments we might give many instances.

BUT beyond this, must we not ask if this movement has not been delayed by other factors, and these even from within ? Thus—what aroused and started its promoters ? Those few of us who, like the present reviewer, were more or less contemporary in age with its various leading founders, and doubtless younger ones as well, can hardly but recall how our too dull school-routine was relieved in hours of leisure by romantic Red Indian tales, of which Fenimore Cooper's *LAST OF THE MOHICANS*, and Captain Mayne Reid's innumerable volumes, still linger in memory. So is not here, in the surviving boy-memories of the founders, the explanation of their adaptation of such Indian-like names and ways into the ceremonies and rituals of English as well as American movements ? Yet also of the lessening general attractiveness of these to a new generation ; and still more in other countries, with quite other traditions and romances of their own. From later anthropology we now know how far these Red Indian romances differed from reality ; and the woodcraft movement knows something of this : but it is still too much possessed by these, and so largely fails to satisfy and convince the everyday public, and their now otherwise interested young people, of its seriousness and value ; much less their prosaic educational authorities ; and, least of all, those many parents and teachers whose retrospect, with all its limitations, is more deeply and rightly based on the fundamental factors of our civilisation—Hebraic, Hellenic and Hellenistic (Roman and Alexandrian) civilisations, as these again from Egyptian, Babylonian and others, with their earlier origins still. Other prehistoric, historic and contemporary cultures, Indian and Chinese especially, are each and all more important, far more deeply influential, than that of the Red Indian, with all the wild picturesqueness of his ever-receding frontier defence, before and in the times of his English-speaking romancers of last century.

III.

So much then for a backwardness of the Woodcraft movement : what now of its forwardness ? Are not the cinemas here progressing far beyond all the Scouting and Woodcraft movements ? Their leaders and interpreters, like Mr. Evans, have read Wells' useful *OUTLINE OF HISTORY*, and encourage visits to the cinema-shows of historic vividness and impressiveness, their nature pictures also. Yet have they realised how widely they might encourage the cinemas at their best, and abate their worst, by directing the ever-growing demand they can control, and thus towards a supply more and more adequate ? Again the Naturalistic, Archaeological, Antiquarian and Historical Societies so widely distributed through the country, seem as yet going on, falling off, or even dying down, without that organised co-operation with the Scouting and Woodcraft movements, which it would be so advantageous to both to establish in each and all distinctive regions. Again, the theatrical and musical professions are alike suffering from the competition of cinemas and "talkies," of wireless and gramophones : yet again what large possibilities of mutual help, as dramatic and musical functions become more regularly undertaken by the Scout and Woodcraft movements. The craft badges on the Boy Scout's arm are an encouraging sign of varied introduction to craftsmanship, and so far well ; but now that working hours are shorter, and unemployment of elder and younger craftsmen only too common, why

not select and recognise the very pick of all kinds of craftsmen, as part of the educational staff of the country; and before long, as definitely as are now its bookish teachers? So too for Girl Guides, for which only a single example of, out of many, must here suffice. The simplification of costume has thrown out of employment embroideresses without number, and lace-makers too: so why not again utilise the pick of these as artist-leaders; guiding the making of banners, of hangings and tapestries, bed-spreads and what not, for homes, for meeting-places, and for the walls of hospital-wards, still usually so dreary? In all such ways in short, and many more, "the good turn" of the Scout movement might be developed; on one side to the diffusion of beauty in arts and crafts—a prime essential of all workmanship truly "good." We already see the Scouts aiding and helping to put and keep in order public functions of many kinds; and in last autumn's papers there was even an account of how the service of an American city—even to its police-courts—had been successfully run by its scouts: thus, doubtless after some previous training, giving at least the bulk of their official staff a week's holiday accordingly. That the factors of social and educational life can in such ways be brought together, and on all levels, is thus reasonably clear: and if so, why not develop their further co-operation, i.e., with these Re-education activities utilising and surpassing the conventional instruction system. What in fact can more vitally and more rapidly advance the true progress of our rusty educational machinery, still conditioned by the decadence of the Renaissance, the dispersiveness of later superficialisms and specialisms alike, and the drudgery and worse of the Examination system, amid all which we are still mainly living, and millions are still learning? Is there not here before us the needed Educational Transition?—as from the present excessive, and wellnigh exclusive, insistence on "the three R's" at all levels, not only primary and secondary, but even higher; and to "the three H's"—of Heart, Hand and Head—in living use of which the three R's arise so easily, as Montessori has shown for small children, and as other educators are finding for their further developments.

IV.

YET another question for these Movements—Why not develop Schools of their own? From thirty years ago or so, when B.P. and Thompson-Seton were beginning, the writer, with two skilled, efficient lady-teachers, shared in the conduct of a Home School, of kindred experimental character and actively domestic, literary and musical; with aid from a tutor, as for Latin a cultivated young ex-Benedictine especially; and last, not least, from various fully skilled workmen and gardeners, crofters and farmers, from stone-cutter and mason, joiner and metal worker, and from fishermen too. Our working conceptions were (1) those of the home life in all ways, from its service to its song and dance, its tableaux and plays; (2) those of survey, (a) through roaming and knowing the scenes of nature within reach, and throughout the seasons, and (b) by becoming increasingly at home also in the two villages and two cities between which we yearly oscillated, and with such participation in their everyday life, and their culture-resources and activities, as their increasing age and experience could cope with, year by year. Here in fact was our Survey Method, with its corresponding activities, with increasing yearly experience of the "Valley Sections" of Forth and Tay, and in time from snows to sea. Though homes, gardens, and neighbourhoods were thus our main fields of activities, for the girls especially, but not exclusively, the older boy especially had experience of quarry and stone, of forest and naturalistic hunt (though not with gun), of shepherding, crofting, farm work also, and from simplest child-beginnings with flowers and

vegetables up to both botanic and intensive gardens; while one of the girls went further still, as garden designer, in Edinburgh and Dublin, &c.; and from former slum-yards to home gardens and spacious private and public pleasancess. As Ruskin long ago wisely insisted, what better education than that of horse and boat: hence the growing boy's self-training, starting with donkey rides in infancy, and coming on to hard-earned skill of horse-breaking for war; similarly from simplest boating to sea-fishing and thence to steersmanship of lifeboat, and to arctic exploration; and finally to airmanship and its "acedom." With all such experience and more, there came naturally, in the right realistic way, the corresponding familiarity with the essentials of each relevant science. With each occupation, too, came some introduction to its literature, beginning with its work-songs, yet progressing to poem and even epic; for what is the *Odyssey*, if not the supreme telling of a sailor's tales? Music, drawing, even modelling, thus also became no less organic possessions: and for all this was ample time, since spared from the long dreary years of school, with just that minimum of experience of these, and from village school to public—to know one's countrymen, and in both working and directive classes; and each easier and better, since at home in real work, and even rising towards its skilled directions as well, as schools do not yet adequately teach. High University distinction thus naturally followed; and with ten different offers of congenial employment in the first month thereafter.

HERE again at Montpellier, in similarly rur-urban and rural conditions, and for University students at all levels, from freshmen to seniors occupied with research theses, most of the like occupational experiences are increasingly available; and sometimes already with cases of successful finding of congenial tasks and decisive choice for life, and serious studies accordingly; though conversely, such less effective students as we have also had, have come too fixedly confirmed in verbalistic ways to utilise such practical opportunities, indispensable for their convalescence. The problem of appropriately developing such Re-education, from the Kindergarten and Montessori class, and through revitalised primary and secondary levels to that of the University with its higher studies and professions, is thus broadly clear; and its associated staff, of studious tutors and working inspirers, is now becoming adequate. For the development however of our College, we correspondingly need—and so especially invite—those who have had timely training in scouting and woodcrafting methods. And with these, for further studies, such of their guides and scout-masters who are disposed experimentally to join our various endeavours, and carry their own higher studies a stage further accordingly; even to psychological, social and educational researches, or to their vital applications towards Re-Education. So why not also develop something of the like in connection with other and nearer centres of higher education? For those who come to our college with something of such preparation, its tutorial guidance will be found of fuller service, in helping them to the right finding and development of their best aptitudes, and thus with fuller profiting by their University studies, both general and professional.

Is it not full time to be vitalising in such living and active ways our higher education in its turn; in and for science, in and for letters; and these alike as liberal culture, and through occupational to professional education, and all in widening citizenship. Hence we aim, and fain would guide more and more efficiently, towards Active Life in Nature and in Civilisation: and these in widening interaction. Is not this true education, towards vital ends, and thus renewing means outworn? *Vivendo discimus!*

P. G.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

SYNTHETIC ASSOCIATION.

SYNTHETIC STUDIES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS.

A SMALL group, occupied with synthetic studies and their applications, has been for many years engaged in research and co-operation; first starting in the Edinburgh School of Sociology, &c., in 1887, and initiating the "Ecole Internationale de l'Exposition" of Paris in 1900; then developing further since the formation of the Sociological Society (now the Institute of Sociology) in 1904, and now also at Montpellier (Collège des Ecossais) since 1924. With the further development and closer association among members of the above three permanent bodies, it is now desired to strengthen their contacts and co-operations with kindred groupings and workers, and also to form the like with others, as widely and fully as may be.

THE methods employed by the present allies have been by turns concrete and abstract; yet these so far as possible in close relation, much as between relief maps and globe, and their necessary mathematical projection of meridians and parallels.

THE concrete approach has mainly been by an extending series of local, regional, and civic Surveys, geographico-historic and contemporary; and many of these have been accompanied by concrete endeavours, up to Reports and plans towards corresponding betterment and progress.

FROM the more abstract approach, there has been carried on an outline survey of the Sciences—mathematico-physical, biological, psychological, social and ethical especially. First towards clearer co-ordination and charting of their respective main fields, with their ever-extending specialisms; so with outlines towards their history, bibliography, &c. The old problem of the classification and inter-relations of the sciences has thus been in some respects advanced, as also those of their varied interaction with arts and applications.

HENCE also increasing reference to philosophic systems, in their essential viewpoints, and towards clearer correlation and presentment of these.

FINALLY, with this extensive range of intellectual surveys, there have been going on various lines of application to Education at its different levels, and to Life in many fields. For as thought and action experimentally interact, so must Synthesis with Synergy. *Vivendo discimus.*

THE co-operation of active students of such questions, and of workers on these lines, is cordially invited. Those interested are requested to write, with some particulars of their studies and activities, to Prof. Geddes, Le Play House, 65, Belgrave Road, London S.W.1.

INTERNATIONAL MORAL EDUCATION CONGRESS.

THE Fifth International Congress of Moral Education will be held at the Sorbonne University, Paris, from September 23rd to 28th, when the following subjects will be discussed: (1) History-teaching; (2) Discipline and Autonomy in Moral Education; (3) Varieties of Methods in Moral Education. As its title suggests, the Congress seeks to promote the moral education of youth by the active co-operation of members of all nations and races irrespective of religious creed or conviction. Full particulars may be obtained from the Honorary Secretary of the British Committee, Mr. F. J. Gould, "Armored," Woodfield Avenue, Ealing, London, W.5.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE FILENE STORE: A STUDY OF EMPLOYEES' RELATION TO MANAGEMENT: by Mary La Dame. Russell Sage Foundation. 1930.

THIS is a very thorough study of relations between employers and employed in the store of the William Filene's Sons Company in Boston. The store (which is world famous) deals in men's and women's clothing and accessories. It employs 3,000 people, 70 per cent. of whom are women.

THE store has for many years been the scene of interesting experiments in workers' participation in management. The main vehicle of this participation has been the Filene Co-operative Association; another vehicle of relations between employers and employed has been the Personnel Division of the store organisation. The book is therefore in the main a study of those two bodies—their activities, their control, and so on.

It is clear that a series of earnest efforts has been made to get the co-operation of employees in the development and maintenance of the business. An arbitration system has been established to deal with complaints of injustice. Representation on the Board of Directors has been granted to employees, and opportunities have been given for stock holding by employees. The details of these and other activities are very illuminating. It is particularly notable that the management has been neutral or opposed to the development of stock holding, and that representation of employees on the Board has now disappeared. The methods of distribution of bonus money—a large proportion going to the managerial side—are also noteworthy.

THE conclusion that seems to emerge is that the system, with all its good points, is not radical enough. The employees are not deeply interested. The store is still to its employees what his investments are to the leisured gentleman. It is a source of income to be spent on interests elsewhere.

FARM INCOME AND FARM LIFE: A SYMPOSIUM: edited by Dwight Sanderson. Cambridge University Press (University of Chicago Press). 1927. (15s. net.)

THIS symposium was prepared by a Joint Committee of the American Country Life Association and the American Farm Economics Association under the Chairmanship of Professor Dwight Sanderson. It aims at being a study of the social and economic factors in rural progress at the present day. At the outset the difficulty of defining those terms is recognised. Progress may be material or immaterial: the trouble with so many present-day definitions lies in their attention to the material and neglect of the immaterial. Further, there is the question how to increase progress. Many different views have been held in answer to these questions, and the articles in this book are obviously not all written from the same standpoint. Throughout, however, there are glimpses of the view that progress is a kind of adjustment—an adjustment that remains imperfect because it is not seen how adjustments in one particular part of the field affect all other parts.

AMONG the most interesting parts of the book will be found those giving the facts on the Standard of Living, and those on Chinese, Japanese, and other labour in California. Throughout it is clear that social conditions are radically affected by economic limitations; the problem of the poor local area is brought out clearly. The chapters on types of farming and their influence on culture is also of special interest, as are those on rural health and education. It seems likely, however, that a reader in this country will close the book feeling that in some respects we have advanced further on this side of the Atlantic, though we are much less conscious of Progress and its problems.

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